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What are the underlying drivers of human development?  This essay argues that long-term 
human development, in incomes, social conditions, security and so on, is fundamentally driven 
by capitalist dynamics and state functioning.  The big issue is not state versus market, or growth 
versus equity, or dynamism versus security.  It is the jointly determined functioning of both 
capitalism and the state.  It is in particular a consequence of the extent to which both capitalist 
and state behaviour is oligarchic, extractive, exploitative and divisive as opposed to being 
inclusive, innovative, accountable, responsive and effective at mediating distributional conflict.  
This can be conceptualized, at a point of time, in terms of the nature of the political equilibrium, 
or, alternatively, the way in which social contracts work.  This is a product of the historically 
shaped interaction between political and economic elites, and between these and various social 
groups.  Specific policy designs of course matter, whether in terms of market-related policy, 
regulation, designs for social provisioning.  But the ways in policy and institutional choices 
work, and indeed the choices societies make, is intimately linked to the nature and functioning of 
the underlying social contracts that in turn shape capitalist dynamics and state behaviour. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1  Introduction
1
What are the underlying, long-term drivers of human development?  This essay seeks to provide 
an interpretation in terms of the nature and dynamics of capitalism and the functioning of the 
state.  It is neither an empirical analysis nor an attempt to systematically  review the vast 
literatures on various aspects of the issues.  It rather draws on these literatures to develop an 
overall argument.  The 20-year edition of the Human Development Report, for which this paper 
was written, would seem to be a good opportunity for such an exercise.  
  
I follow in the tradition of the HDRs in treating human development as a multi-dimensional 
conception of the  possibilities people have for leading a good life.
2
So what has to be explained? Take the following stylized facts  on the core measurable 
dimensions of human development: 
  This, essentially 
opportunity-based, conception, can be imperfectly proxied by observed outcomes of material 
wealth, educational status and health status, along with other more complex dimensions of well-
being, including dignity and participation in social and political life.  
•  Huge  inter-national, and inter-personal inequalities in all dimensions of well-being, 
associated with massive differences in opportunities. 
•  No inter-country convergence in material dimensions of well-being, but major, growth 
surges in East Asia and India, that has been a force for convergence for some groups of 
people in the world.  
•  Steady, long-term advances for most, but not all, nations and groups in both educational 
and health status over the past few decades, with apparently significant convergence by 
some measures (the most important exception relating to the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
health status in a set of mainly Sub-Saharan African countries)  
 
                                                        
1 Thanks to Sam Hickey, Jeni Klugman, Lant Pritchett, Ana Revenga, Francisco Rodríguez and 
Frances Stewart, for comments and conversations.  
2 This is based on the conceptualizations by Sen, see Sen (1984, 1999).  
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These have occurred in the context of major economic and political shifts since the first HDR 
was written in 1990. These include: 
•  Substantial spread in the reach of broadly capitalist forms of production—albeit in 
differing varieties—with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of a form of 
capitalism in China, and significant reductions in state controls of economic activity in 
many countries, most notably India. 
•  Major systemic economic shocks at the global and national level, including in particular 
the crises in East Asia in 1997-98 (centred in countries associated with the “East Asian 
Miracle”) and the international financial crisis of 2008-09 that started in the core of the 
global capitalist system in the United States. 
•  The steady extension of formal, procesual democracy in much of the developing world 
and the former Soviet Union. 
•  The spread of local participation in many developing countries, whether via political 
decentralization (for example in India and much of Latin America) or growing use of 
participation in service delivery. 
The issue to be explored is how these two categories of development are related.  This is framed 
around three questions. 
First, what is the role of different forms of capitalism in terms of (i) economic dynamism (ii) 
effects on inequalities and inclusion, and (iii) short-run volatility and long-run sustainability? 
Second, how does the functioning of the state affect human development in terms of (i) the 
accountability to all citizens of national polities (whether or not this is under formal democratic 
auspices), (ii) the reach and effectiveness of local participatory processes, and (iii) the extent to 
which exclusions of stigmatized or exploited groups has changed? 
Third, what are the deep drivers of any shifts in the relationship between capitalism, state 
functioning and social and economic progress? 
Here is an outline of the argument.  
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Capitalism—in its  varied forms—is the only institutional mechanism capable of supporting 
sustained economic dynamism, that is necessary, but insufficient, for transformative changes in 
most dimensions of human development.  However, there are large contrasts between different 
forms of capitalism, with respect to long-run dynamism and effects on inequality and insecurity.  
This is particularly the case between “oligarchic” forms of capitalism and open, inclusive forms 
of capitalism.  Some forms of oligarchic capitalism—often in concert with significant levels of 
state engagement—can be sources of extended periods of advance, but this is rarely sustained 
beyond two to three decades, and is often associated with high levels of inequality.  With respect 
to other dimensions  of human development, while capitalist advance can lead to growing 
demand for skills and a healthy workforce, there are also tendencies that lead to conflicts with 
security and dignity, and heightened inequalities, absent complementary societal and state action.  
Finally, capitalism is intrinsically weak, again absent countervailing policies, on questions of 
environmental sustainability,  given the time horizon of most firms and the widespread 
importance of externalities in this area. 
 The state is the second dominant force affecting the success or failure in the dynamics of human 
development  at the national level, both through its indirect role in shaping the nature of 
capitalism and its direct role in social provisioning, via finance, actual provision and regulation, 
in domains that include education, water and sanitation, public health and a range of institutions 
for  the provision for security  and the protection of citizens from abuse.  State action is 
powerfully complementary to capitalist dynamics in influencing human development outcomes.  
But there are also large varieties of state behaviour.  Indeed, there is an analogous contrast in 
performance between relatively oligarchic, extractive states and accountable, inclusive states.  
While the extent and pattern of political accountability lies behind this contrast, these variations 
occur under both authoritarian and democratic  auspices.  However, an accountable and 
responsive state under authoritarian auspices is much more likely to be contingent on the 
particular configuration of political forces.  Furthermore, despite the theoretical role of 
government in providing public goods and managing externalities, states are also often weak on 
environmental sustainability, a consequence of short political and electoral time horizons. 
The issue for human development concerns the form of capitalism and the nature of the state.  
The systemic functioning of both capitalism and the state is often aligned, in terms of the degree  
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to which both economic and state-mediated processes support inclusive, long-term advances in 
human development.  More fundamentally, capitalism and the state form part of an integrated 
social, economic and political system.  There are, of course, specific tradeoffs on the division 
between state activity and the market, but the big questions are not around state versus market, 
but over the jointly determined nature of capitalism and the state.  The deep drivers of this lie in 
politics, and in particular the nature of the underlying social contracts between the state, business 
and various social groups, including, in particular, the relationship between political and 
economic elites.  Another way of putting this is in terms of the extent to which the political 
equilibrium supports institutional arrangements that foster more inclusive forms of capitalism 
and a more accountable and inclusive state.  
This structuring of institutions interacts with what may be termed capacities of both capitalists 
and the state.  Such capacities flow from historically shaped developments, and go way beyond 
the effects of generalized education.  While they are surely endogenous in the long term, at a 
point of time (in the dynamics of decadal change) these can have substantial influence.  Broader 
societal conditions—from socio-cultural norms to civil society organisations—are of great 
importance, including in influencing behaviours of business and state actors.  But specific civil 
society action is typically subsidiary in its proximate effects to capitalism and the state.  Finally, 
global  influences also matter—notably technical progress related to  health, effects of 
international markets in goods and finance, aid flows, the general influence of ideas and 
spillovers of conflict.  However, these generally influence human development essentially in 
their interaction with domestic institutional structures. 
The essay is an interpretation that is based on various existing literatures: selected references are 
provided along the way.  Here I would particularly highlight the work by Acemoglu, Robinson 
and co-authors (e.g. 2004, and forthcoming) on the institutional foundations of development, 
Rajan and Zingales (e.g. 2003) on capitalism, Morck and co-authors (e.g. 2004) on corporate 
functioning,  Lindert  (2004)  on  the  history of social provisioning in  now-rich countries, 
Engerman and Sokoloff (e.g. 2001, 2002) on historical comparisons across the Americas, and 
work in the World Bank (2005) on equity and development.  
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The remainder of the essay is organized into  four  sections.  The next two sections  review 
respectively the role of capitalism in relation to material advance and other dimensions of human 
development, and the state in relation to social provisioning.  Section four then discusses the 
question of deep drivers of capitalism and state functioning, focusing on the role of implicit 
social contracts; this includes a brief account of categories of country experiences and transitions   
There is some discussion of policy  along the way, and a  final  fifth  section draws some 
implications for approaches to policy of this diagnostic prism, drawing on two examples from 
quite different domains—the Indian economic liberalisation, and a specific instance of Mexican 
social policy reform. 
2  Capitalism and human development 
Capitalism comes in various forms.  Let’s take as a working definition that capitalism is a form 
of organizing production that involves extensive private ownership of the means of production, 
with associated property rights over the fruits of production for firms and of effort for workers.  
However, the nature of  productive  organizations  can range from peasant farms  to informal 
family enterprises, and from family controlled conglomerates to firms with dispersed ownership 
via stock exchanges. Often there is state ownership of parts of the system.  Capitalism can cover 
a  multitude of sins—from highly competitive markets, to state-private mixes,  to  oligarchic 
dominance—with varying degrees of property rights. These differences can have a profound 
effect on performance.  A useful categorization, drawing partially on Baumol et al (2007), is 
between state capitalism (in which the state plays an active directive role, with selective 
ownership), oligarchic capitalism (in which major parts of the business sector and associated 
markets are  dominated by family-controlled firms), and forms  of capitalism in which the 
underlying institutions are supportive of entry and exit of activities—Schumpeterian creative 
destruction—that can involve either large or small, “entrepreneurial” firms.  In the following, I 
also emphasize variations within oligarchic capitalist forms. 
There is not a readily available measure of the form of capitalism, or the degree of oligarchy.  
That is one reason why this is an interpretative essay, rather than an empirical paper.  To give 
some motivation, Table 1 (from Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000) shows measures of the 
extent to which top families in East Asia controlled listed corporate assets in 1996—just before  
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the East Asian crisis.  For the top 15 families, this was over 60% in Indonesia, 55% in the 
Philippines, 38% in Korea and 34% in Hong Kong.   For Mexico, the top 15 firms in the stock 
exchange—all family-controlled—accounted for 40% of total value—and this is a substantial 
underestimate since it does not account for pyramids. 
Table 1.  Control of publicly listed capital by top families in East Asia  
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000. 
So how does capitalism influence the various dimensions of human development?   Here are 
some hypotheses, with respect first to the average material well-being in a society, and then to 
other dimensions of well-being, inequalities, insecurity and sustainability.  
The long-run transformation of average levels of material well-being is only feasible with a 
capitalist dynamic.  
In historical perspective, capitalism has been extraordinarily successful in some parts of the 
world: in pushing the world’s technological frontier, in supporting modest steady growth over 
the very long term in now-rich countries, and in the dramatic transformations that have occurred, 
at an unprecedented historical pace, in the small number of countries that have sustained rapid 
growth.  The latter include in particular Japan, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia and others of the 
earlier East Asian miracle phase, in phases in Brazil and Mexico, and in ongoing processes in 
China and India.   
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All  cases of transformative success  have involved some mix  of indigenous capitalism and 
participation in global markets.  However, none have involved the ideal of free markets and 
atomistic firms.  Most have rather involved a blend of state involvement and oligarchic features 
of the pattern of ownership of the business sector.  This has taken the form of a significant share 
of state-owned enterprises and state banking in China, and to a lesser extent India.  It has 
involved extensive state engagement with the business sector in Japan and Korea.  The typical 
business ownership structure for the large firm part of the economy has been of family controlled 
conglomerates, notably in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico etc.—in 
other words with the structural features of oligarchic capitalism. 
The most important exception to this view is the initial, multi-decade growth of economies in the 
Soviet Bloc: full state ownership and planning was able to support an extended period of catch-
up in average levels of production per head.  But this involved very high levels of inefficiency, 
that both reduced the pace of advance in material living standards and  eventually proved 
unsustainable. 
But capitalism has also been less successful, or pernicious, in many areas 
Despite the dominance of some form of capitalism throughout the world, the pace and pattern of 
expansion of average living standards has been immensely varied.  There are several types of 
malaise. 
First, a capitalist dynamic can lead to transformative periods of growth that then peter out: Brazil 
and Mexico are iconic examples.  Indonesia in the wake of 1997/98 crisis looks similar.  Figure 1 
illustrates the contrast between India, Indonesia, Korea and Mexico: it shows that Mexico’s past 
“miraculous” growth took it to average levels of  productivity way above where India and 
Indonesia is now; and that Korea’s sustained growth marked an additional, dramatic 
transformation in production.  Moreover, this had big impacts on measures of material poverty: 
on the international yardstick of US$2 (at purchasing power parity), the proportion of Mexicans 
living in poverty was 5%, compared with 76% for India in the mid-2000s.  
  8 
Figure 1. Varied experiences in average living standards: GDP per capita in India, Indonesia, 
Korea and Mexico between 1950 and 2004 
Source: Penn World Table Version 6.2 
More generally, growth spurts are quite common; what is rare is sustained rapid growth 
(Hausmann, Rodrik and Pritchett, 2005).  The Commission on Growth and Development (2009), 
found only 13 economies that have grown at 7 percent or more for 25 years or longer—these 
include the familiar East Asian cases, plus Botswana, Brazil, Malta and Oman (India hasn’t yet 
crossed this threshold, and Mexico didn’t quite make it.)  Kharas (2009) used the term the 
“middle income trap” to characterize economies who managed to get to middle income status, 
and then suffered a meandering growth path, seemingly failing to effect the further, Korean-style 
transformation. 
Second, a capitalist dynamic has failed to take off in any transformative fashion in many poor 
countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.   There is certainly a mix of small-scale 
entrepreneurial activity—often in informal, unregulated parts of the economy—and selected 
large-scale investments by foreign firms, notably in  mining sectors.  But there has been no 
sustained take-off.  Even a Brazilian or Mexican style problem of growth that then peters out 
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Third, capitalism in its  oligarchic form has  often  distorted  both  market structures and 
governmental functioning.  This occurs to some degree throughout the world, including in rich 
countries such as the United States.  However, such distortionary influences are particularly 
pervasive in countries such as Mexico, Russia, the Philippines, and latter phases of Indonesia’s 
high growth period.  In Mexico, for example, oligarchic business structures dominate formal 
production, and are a source of high costs and restricted supply in many sectors (see Levy and 
Walton, 2009 for a collection of assessments).  Telecoms is a telling example: the privatization 
of the public telephone company under President Salinas led to a temporary monopoly of the 
privatized entity, owned by groups controlled by Carlos Slim Helú.  When formal competition 
(backed by an independent competition authority) occurred, the company could use its market 
power, its influence, and a weak legal system to sustain its position of market dominance, 
leading  to  high costs, restricted supply, and high profits.  This helped  Slim on a path to 
becoming, in early 2010, the world’s richest man.  
Fourth, failures in information and regulation led to a pattern of innovation and expansion of 
financial capitalism that created the global financial crisis of 2008/09.  This had some features of 
big-firm influence on regulatory design—analogous to pernicious aspects of oligarchic 
capitalism.
3
Interpretation of varied growth dynamics 
  It was also a consequence of a market system that provided incentives for product 
innovation that obscured the underlying properties of financial products. This, knowingly or 
unknowingly, contributed to private enrichment but heightened risk, and to excessive innovation 
of a socially harmful kind.  Apart from the high costs of the crisis itself, this structure was also a 
source of long-run growth problems, given the powerful incentive for allocation of some of the 
best talent—including scientific minds—into financial product development rather than 
productive innovations. 
How should this varied mix of experience be interpreted?  Observed experiences are of course a 
product not of capitalism alone, but of the interaction between capitalist processes, state action 
and social functioning.  With this caveat, here are some interpretations on the functioning of 
capitalism: 
                                                        
3 See in particular Johnson and Kwak (2010).  
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•  First, a positive capitalist dynamic is extraordinarily difficult with insecure property 
rights, at least for the capitalists.  Large-scale production is typically limited to forms of 
extraction (from legal mining to blood diamonds).  Resolution of security of property 
rights, is not, however, a question of transplanting legal and regulatory institutions from 
now-rich countries.  Such institutions work within a political and social context.  As an 
example, the Mexican growth occurred because of the essentially informal, politically 
supportable mechanisms that led to good-enough protection of property rights for 
domestic large business families (essentially oligarchic businesses  with good 
connections) and, post-NAFTA, for foreign businesses (Haber et al. 2003, 2008).  In 
similar spirit, business aspects of Indonesian rapid growth were based on a self-enforcing 
arrangement between the Chinese capital and the political, including military,  elite 
around Soeharto (further discussed below).  This security of property rights, at least for 
some groups, has to be consistent with the other side of economic change: that capitalist 
transformation also requires significant reassignment of property rights, notably for 
natural resource extraction and land for industrial production.  This requires mechanisms 
to manage this vis-à-vis social groups, mechanisms that may be extractive or equitable. 
•  Second, oligarchic forms of capitalism can be associated with high levels of investment 
and growth for  extended phases—especially where there is potential for substantial 
economic rents (for which property rights for the capitalists is one condition) plus some 
pressures for innovation and change.  Thus the Brazilian and Mexican growth miracles.  
However, oligarchic forms are also  associated with economic entrenchment (the 
consolidation of the economic position of incumbents
4
•  Third, the nature of state involvement has a formative influence on capitalist dynamics.  
The state often supports capitalist growth—indeed almost all periods of rapid growth 
have had some degree of either state ownership or support—but state engagement suffers 
from analogous problems to oligarchic forms.  These are linked: the combination of state 
) and are thus often intrinsically 
weak on creative destruction; this may explain common successes in periods of import 
substituting industrialization under protective barriers.  They also have a strong tendency 
to exert influence over, or capture, state behaviour. This can further support extraction of 
rents from consumers and other producers. 
                                                        
4 See Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2004) for a discussion of entrenchment.  
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involvement and oligarchic capitalism can both help solve  problems of credibility of 
commitment and of obtaining the information on the “needs” of capitalists, and can lead 
to collusion for rent-extraction that is bad for average growth.  A particularly developed 
form of the first scenario—the state as  supporter of and counterweight to  capitalist 
advance—was a feature of some of the East Asian successes, characterized as “embedded 
autonomy” by Evans (1995). 
•  Fourth, there is an issue of entrepreneurial and organisational “capacity”.  This is surely 
endogenous over the long term.  However, a feature of most significant growth episodes 
has been the  action of indigenous capitalists—for example,  India’s takeoff from the 
1980s was, at least initially, based around a set of longstanding business families.  
Mexico’s growth—while stalled in the long term—also was around families with 
business traditions.  Chinese business families were at the centre of much of the East 
Asian growth take off, from Indonesia to mainland China.   Korean business family-run 
chaebol drove Korean expansion.  And so on.  In a historical perspective Bayly (2008) 
emphasizes the interaction between colonial action and local business capabilities as 
shaping post-independence growth and business dynamics in India and some African 
countries.  This can, of course, be a two-edged sword, since on the other side of strong 
business “capacity” lie the excesses of oligarchic capitalism.  It is sometimes suggested 
that reliance on foreign capital constitutes an alternative: many countries have indeed 
made use of foreign investment  (Ireland and Singapore are striking examples), but 
extreme reliance on foreign firms is rare, and there is something important around the 
domestic capacity. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (forthcoming) argue that long-term economic growth is only feasible in 
the context of “inclusive economic institutions”, by which they mean a set of institutional 
arrangements that support the enforcement of property rights, guarantee law and order, support 
contract enforcement, allow new businesses and activities to enter and existing activities to be 
destroyed, and support the functioning of markets for goods, labour and capital. They contrast 
these with “extractive economic institutions”, that are associated with rent creation and 
extraction.  Extractive economic institutions can be aligned with growth in average material 
standards for a while, but do not support the broad-based, as opposed to selective, protection of  
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property rights, or the processes of creative destruction that are necessary for long term growth.  
This prism is relevant to the variety of experiences outlined here: oligarchic capitalism is the 
dominant form in development, but breeds successes and failures; there is something about the 
interaction with other institutions, and especially with the functioning of the state, that shapes 
this dynamic.  Acemoglu and Robinson further argue that inclusive economic institutions are 
only consolidated in the context of inclusive political institutions.  We return to these questions 
in Section 4 on interpretation and the role of social contracts. 
Capitalism has a mixed record on other dimensions of well-being. 
Let’s now turn to other aspects of well-being.  It is useful to distinguish between different 
dimensions of well-being (or different functionings in Sen’s terminology) and properties of those 
dimensions across the population, including inequalities (with deprivation of the poorest  of 
particular welfare interest), volatility and sustainability over time.  Thus the discussion in the 
previous section was confined to average, or typical, levels of material well-being.  Here I start 
with a perspective on three clearly distinct dimensions—health status, education status and 
dignity.  Then in the following subsections, I turn to questions of inequality, insecurity and 
sustainability. 
Given the limited space available, the large and varied literatures, and the fact that we actually 
observe the products of complex interactions between capitalism, state action and society, the 
following considerations require even more heroic acts of distillation and synthesis than the 
preceding section.  But I think it is worth a try.  Here goes. 
Capitalism and education.  It is useful to assess the influence of capitalism in terms of direct 
economic effects—capitalist “demands” for skills—and the indirect effects on societal and state 
functioning, and engagement in provisioning.   
With respect to educational attainment, in current phases—including the past few decades—the 
direct effects of capitalism has been largely in favour of increasing educational attainment.   This 
is for the obvious reason that more educated workers are more productive: modern industrial and 
service production requires at least basic education for “unskilled” production workers, 
complemented by a range of higher skills in management, engineering etc.   Of equal importance  
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for long-term growth, sustained productivity increase requires steady educational upgrading, as 
economies shift up the ladder of sophistication, capital-intensity, skill-intensity, and 
organizational requirements of production, both in terms or product mix and production 
processes.  This is driven both by domestic wage increases  as the unskilled labour market 
tightens, and global interactions, as new economies enter labour-intensive production for traded 
goods.  Both domestic and global influences lead to the skill-biased technical change that has 
been an important source of widening of wage differences, discussed below.  A particular aspect 
of the upgrading involves the role of high-level skills in innovation, both in adaptation of 
products and processes to domestic conditions, and in pushing out the frontier by global leaders 
in economic production. 
This positive effect is not universal.  Both historically and in the contemporary period, some 
forms of production have depended primarily on brute force, and employers have had an interest 
in low-wage, unskilled work—or, as in mining and construction, on-the-job training usually from 
when young men first enter the workforce.  In a particular case,  Tendler (2003)  found a 
preference of industrial firms in the North East of Brazil to have unskilled—only primary 
education—workers, on the grounds that secondary educated workers would have a preference 
for service sector work and would be more difficult to control.  She termed this the “fear of 
education”.   A broader fear of education may occur if economic elites are concerned about the 
effects of education on political mobilization of the masses—there have been plenty of regimes 
that have systematically neglected education.  Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) formally model 
the trade-off between the productivity raising effects of education, and the potential costs to 
elites of loss of income shares and power. 
With respect to indirect effects, probably the most important issue concerns interactions with tax-
raising by the state, that is necessary to support state provisioning of education.  Businesses 
typically prefer low taxes, and are often effective in lobbying for these.   
Finally, private schooling and university education is becoming an important source of delivery 
of education, and can both alleviate supply constraints and be a source of upward pressure on 
quality.  
  14 
Capitalism and health.   Effects on health status are more difficult to assess.  Firms have a 
demand for a healthy workforce, but the links between capitalist demands and general health are 
complex.  Much of the improvement in health status in developing countries comes from public 
health interventions—around water and sanitation, immunization etc—that firms have little 
direct demand for.  Indeed, in some areas of mining and industrial production, the effects on 
health status of workers and their families can be pernicious, either because effects on worker 
productivity are low in the short run or because ill-effects are external to the firm (see the review 
of mining production in India in Centre for Science and the Environment, 2009,  for many 
examples of adverse influences.)  Provisioning of insurance for curative health is likely to occur 
only when it is in a firm’s interest to maintain the health of its whole employee pool, or where 
such pooling and associated insurance can form a part of a preferred remuneration offer (that 
would be expected to lead to a lower money wage).  The US problems in both company-linked 
insurance, and in the effects of the private insurance part of the health system on costs and 
exclusion, are a vivid illustration of the problems. These include the role of concentrated lobbies 
as a block to rational health reform. 
On the production side, private firms play a large role in provisioning for curative health in most 
developing countries.  This is an important source of service, but issues of regulation, 
information, quality and insurance remain pervasive.  In addition, private provisioning of water 
and sanitation has risen in significance since the 1990s: this has not taken off nearly to the extent 
of private supply in telecoms and utility, but, if well-regulated, can lead to expansion in supply 
that is good for consumer welfare and health.  A study of the Argentine water privatization 
attributed improvements in infant mortality to expansion of private supply at a municipal level 
(Galiani, Gertler and Schardgrodsky, 2002) 
Capitalism and dignity.  Perhaps yet more difficult to generalize is the influence on human, and 
especially worker, dignity.  There is, of course, widespread documentation of historical and 
contemporary abuse: employers often lack incentives to treat workers with respect, and have 
asymmetric power.  There can also be productivity gains for firms from workplace conditions 
that confer greater dignity on work.   But there is no guarantee that this will be the dominant 
outcome—that is that firms who support the dignity of their workers will outcompete abusing 
firms.  Where capitalist advance is associated with greater formalization of work this can bring a  
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set of complementary gains for workers, in terms of the quality of the workplace, whether this 
flows from governmental regulation or worker organization and action. 
Capitalism can be associated with rising inequalities, but effects are mixed and contingent. 
The intuition of many observers is probably that capitalism is good for dynamism, and so for 
average levels of well-being, but is inequality-increasing—absent countervailing action by the 
state—as it intrinsically involves big rewards to the successful, even before you get into 
questions of influence. There is something important to this intuition, but it is not the whole story 
by any means.   
Let’s start by noting  some  domains and locations capitalism  has had significantly  inclusive 
elements.  Here are some important examples. 
•  The expansion of formal work—that is (contingently) associated with greater worker 
protections on security, health hazards and dignity—though this is typically good for 
insiders, those who can access formal work, and is not relevant to households dependent 
on informal work. 
•  The entry of new large, medium and small firms within countries.  This is the converse of 
entrenched, protected business oligarchy, and, when it occurs, is a source of greater 
equality of opportunity in the entrepreneurial space, as well as greater economic 
dynamism, through its effect on creative destruction.  As an example, India in its current 
25-year period of relatively rapid growth—has witnessed both expansion of a range of 
long-established business families, often from traditionally business-oriented castes and 
groups, and broader entry of individuals into successful business—including from castes 
traditionally not associated with business, including amongst Hindus from the so-called 
“other backward castes”  (Damodaran, 2008) 
•  The  entry of developing country multinationals into global markets, including 
emblematic groups such as LG and Samsung from Korea, Tata from India, América 
Móvil from Mexico.  Now this involves the entry of rich groups and individuals, in terms 
of capital resources and wealth, but is surely a specific form of global horizontal equity—
and one that is often of governmental and societal interest.  
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•  At the other end of the social scale, capitalistic and market-oriented processes can be a 
source of the breakdown of traditional, unequal social differences.  For example, in India, 
there has been a gradual breakdown of caste-based work allocations, that historically 
confined dalits (previously known as untouchable groups) to the most menial and often 
demeaning forms of work.  A recent survey involving retrospective interviews  find 
substantial changes in both work allocation and consumption choices amongst dalit 
groups in one of the poorest and supposedly “backward” parts of the India, rural Uttar 
Pradesh.
5
On the other hand, capitalism has been associated with substantial pressures for increased 
inequalities, for example in the following areas. 
 
•  Extreme concentrations of wealth, whether in obscene top salaries in the US, or the more 
typical form of the combination of business wealth and oligarchy that revolves around 
family firms in developing countries (notably in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Thailand, Russia…indeed almost all middle income countries).  The Forbes billionaire 
list is the tip of the iceberg, though provides one measure, illustrated for India and 
Mexico in Figure 2.  
•  Unequal relations of work, and heightened health risks (especially in mining) and in some 
areas abuse of workers. 
•  The skill-biased technical change and the growing globalization of wage determination. 
Skill-biased technical change was a driving force between rising wage differences in 
Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, often mediated by the structural 
shifts mediated by opening to trade and foreign direct investment (see Sánchez-Páramo 
and Schady, 2003 for an empirical assessment for six major countries) 
                                                        
5 This work is not yet in the public domain; this result is based on discussion with Devesh Kapur 
and Lant Pritchett.  
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Figure 2.  The evolution of billionaire wealth in India and Mexico 
 
Source: Forbes.com and World Development Indicators. 
However, the net effect of capitalism and all other things going on in society is often unclear, 
with ambiguous or contingent association with inequalities of income and wealth.  As has been 
well documented, the United States, the leading capitalist nation, experienced a long fall in 
inequalities in the first part of the 20
th century followed by a long rise.  A major part of the story 
lies in the interaction between rising demands for skills and rising supply—the race between 
education and technology (see Goldin and Katz, 2008).  But part of the interpretation has also 
been attributed to shifts in what is supported by the polity, a product of a mix of effective 
lobbying and prevailing narratives, whether these are consistent with the empirical evidence of 
not.  (Atkinson 2003; Piketty and Saez, 2001 though they don’t frame the argument in terms of 
lobbying pressures.)  Some of the iconic cases of rapid, long-term capitalist advance—Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan—appear to have done so at relatively modest levels of inequality.  However, in 
recent decades many developing countries have experienced rising inequality.  This is true of 
China, almost certainly true of India, as well as for other South Asian countries. In Latin 
America there have been more increases than falls in inequality (de Ferranti et al 2004), though  
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Brazil in the 2000s enjoyed a significant decline in its initially very high level of inequality.  
Data on Sub-Saharan Africa is too weak to support a firm view on an overall trend, though it is 
noteworthy that the region has some of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. 
Some observers go further and argue that capitalism intrinsically causes poverty—see, for 
example, Harris-White (2005).  As a general, long-term phenomenon, this is hard to support.  
There are particular cases where capital has caused hardship—interactions with mining 
investment providing many examples—but on average, where capitalism has been successful in 
the developing world, it has been associated with reduced, not increased poverty.  The biggest 
short-run qualification to this view comes in crises. 
Capitalism and insecurity: bad in crises 
Capitalism has been associated with dramatic economic crises, with profound adverse effects on 
well-being.  In the past twenty years, there have been crises in countries with a tradition of 
macroeconomic instability, including Argentina, Mexico and Turkey.  But this was also the 
period of the East Asian crisis, that was shocking because it was at the heart of the  great 
development success of the post-war period, in a set of countries that had proved to be pretty 
resilient to previous economic shocks.  And it, of course also involved the sub-prime crisis, that 
was even more shocking as it started at the heart of the most developed part of the global 
capitalist system.  
Crises have large adverse effects on average well-being.  Moreover, the losses are often 
distributed in an inequitable manner.  Crises involve large changes in asset prices, economic 
recessions and increased spending for some, especially through automatic stabilizers, bailouts 
and discretionary increases in safety net or compensatory spending.  Those who gain—relatively, 
and sometimes absolutely—are generally those with greatest information and financial agility, 
groups  protected by automatic stabilizers (unemployment insurance in countries, depositors 
where there is deposit insurance) and those with influence.  In financial and currency crises, this 
can often include insiders to the financial system, at the expense of outsiders.  Analysis of Latin 
American crises found that financial sector insiders often got their money out early and even 
enjoyed capital gains when domestic asset prices collapses, (as in Argentina), and were often  
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bailed out in financial system rescue packages, sometime including equity holders (as in Mexico, 
for example) (Halac and Schmukler, 2003, de Ferranti et al 2004).  While democratic or other 
popular pressures typically induce some discretionary spending (including, to varying degrees, in 
Argentina, Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) these are typically small relative to the size of 
bailouts.  Meanwhile wages generally suffer large declines, and wage shares fall—implying 
shares of profits rise (Diwan, 2001, 2002).  The fiscal bill is financed by future increases in taxes 
and reduced spending—and since spending is often progressive at the margin, this can also be 
inequitable (de Ferranti et al, 2004) 
Do the periodic crises represent a deep flaw of capitalism?  A better way of seeing this is as an 
intrinsic feature of capitalist processes, especially in the absence of perfect information and 
markets, where these are insufficiently countervailed by effective policy.   Part of this is a 
question of smarter  regulatory and policy design—avoiding premature capital account 
liberalisation (now, belatedly, even recognized by the IMF), saving commodity booms (as Chile 
very successfully did when copper prices were high in the recent period) managing carefully the 
introduction of new financial products (though how to do this is still hotly contested in the 
United States).  But political economy and underlying political and social structures come in here 
as well.  Many countries aspire to contracyclical fiscal policy, but many increase fiscal deficits in 
the good times—something that the United States under President George W Bush and 
Venezuela under Hugo Chavez had in common.  One of the big debates in the wake of the 
subprime crisis is whether the political influence of large financial institutions has led to the 
consolidation of moral hazard in the post-crisis policy and regulatory action of the United States 
(as Johnson and Kwak, 2010, argue). 
Two other points are relevant to the relationship between capitalism and insecurity.  
First, the net effect of capitalism and state action has led to a dualistic design of risk management 
in most developing countries, in which formal mechanisms for managing health, unemployment, 
accident and other forms of worker and household insecurity are linked to formal contracts in 
large firms.  This was not inevitable: it rather formed part of the Bismarckian heritage of social 
security design, that was based around employment.  It has high costs: in creating disincentives  
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for formality, in creating politically salient groups with an interest in their continuance, and in 
weak provisioning for outsiders.  This is ill-designed capitalism. 
Second, in poor countries the most common, and devastating, shocks are not associated with 
macroeconomic crises, but rather with the weather, catastrophic health problems and natural 
disasters.  These have little or nothing to with capitalism. 
Capitalism and sustainability: intrinsically inadequate 
To some degree a mixed story also applies to environmental sustainability: in the sense that 
predominantly capitalist societies did a lot better than old-style socialist countries in the Soviet 
bloc, that had a typically awful record on the environment.  However, this was probably more to 
do with weak democratic pressures, poor information, and the slow technological upgrading of 
communist industries to newer, cleaner production techniques. 
Beyond this unhappy comparison, there are important areas where the incentives at the heart of 
capitalism fly in the face of either local or global sustainability.  This is seen in local water and 
air pollution from industries and mining, in environmental destruction in many mining activities 
or in the resistance to facing up to climate change (including amongst European industries that 
managed to get the quotas in the European cap and trade system allocated free  rather than 
auctioned.)  In some areas—such as effects on social living conditions of mining—there are also 
adverse social effects, associated with displacement and ill-health.  These are classic cases of 
external effects, often interacting with time horizons of firms that are shorter than appropriate for 
the evaluation of societal well-being.  And, as in most areas, they can interact with political and 
social structures, especially where the adverse effects are concentrated in groups with weak 
political influence or social status, and state officials and politicians are bribable. 
Interpretation and policy 
Let’s step back and have a first assessment of what this account means for policy and 
institutional design.  The proximate issues relate to the form of capitalism, the incentives 
capitalists face, and interactions with complementary policies and institutions, that both 
influence the behaviour of capitalists and the preparedness and protection of workers, consumers  
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and affected households. The big issue is how capitalism and markets become embedded in 
social and political structures. This was a central concern of Polanyi (1944) that is still highly 
relevant today: reviewing an earlier phase of capitalism up to the Second World War he argued 
that capitalist structures induced a dual movement—on the one hand of concentration and social 
costs driven by the internal dynamic of capitalist production processes; on the other a 
countervailing political demand for social provisioning, security and the regulation of capitalist 
excess.    The latter can lead to over-reach as (arguably) occurred with some aspects of 
Eurosclerosis, or the Fabian bent of much Indian industrial and social policy in the initial post-
independence period. 
Subsequent  experience, including of developing countries, supports the view of swings and 
tensions between reliance on “self-regulating” features of capitalism and assertive government 
action (Stewart, 2010). It is certainly true that capitalism has good and bad faces—it can be a 
source of expansion of wealth and of social costs.  But the contrast between some forms of 
oligarchic and inclusive capitalism are also salient to the variation in aggregate growth rates in 
material conditions.  In other words the choice is not necessarily between dynamic aggregate 
growth, with social costs along the way, and more modest growth with better social conditions.   
All too often the worst types of oligarchic capitalism—often embedded in the state—are bad for 
average growth, even if they do well at extraction of short-run rents for the influential.  On the 
other hand, more inclusive forms of capitalism are not only more dynamic, but can be consistent 
with greater equity and security.  
So what are the implications for policy? Let’s start with proximate policy choices—neglecting 
political economy for a while.  Here the issue is not simply  one  of  regulating capitalism: 
experience clearly shows that excessive regulation can lead to an overbearing state, or can be 
captured and influenced by alliances between business and political elites, or with protected 
worker groups.   This is where the old-style pro-market critics are right.  But right now the 
system has sicknesses that need to be fixed—for the sake of broad-based human development 
including aggregate growth.  It is useful to divide this into policies that shape the institutions of 
capitalism itself, and complementary measures. 
 (a) policies affecting the institutions of capitalism  
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What kind of policies constitute “open economic institutions”, in Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
term, that are necessary for innovation and creative destruction?  Here’s a sketch of a list: 
•  Institutions that allow entry of new business activities, and protect property rights equally 
for new  entrants  and incumbents;  competition policy, financial inclusion, minority 
shareholder rights and underlying legal and institutional designs.  These are at the core 
argument of Saving capitalism from the capitalists, by Rajan and Zingales (2003), in an 
argument that goes back to Adam Smith.
6
•  Evening up the “business environment” for small and medium firms, that are typically 
subject to harassment and abuse from police and bureaucrats, often linked  to 
inappropriate urban and regulatory designs against informal activity. 
 
•  Forms of regulation of mining and utilities that tackle market failures, including social 
and environment externalities and network effects, in ways that also reduce risks of either 
capture or excessive hold up. 
•  More speculatively, in terms of technical design and political economy, fostering an 
environment for the development of indigenous businesses and local innovation, 
potentially with policies on foreign direct investment that provide either strong incentives 
for domestic linkages, or temporary protection. 
(b) complementary policies to increase human development gains from capitalism 
A second category of policies belongs primarily to the direct functioning of the state, but is 
pertinent here because of the tight complementarity with capitalist dynamics—think of these as 
efficient designs for the Polanyi dual movement.  Here’s a second list: 
•  Society-wide checks and balances in the functioning of the legal system and democratic 
institutions of the legislature and executive—all of which are essential to the functioning 
of the institutions of capitalism. 
                                                        
6 Khemani (2007) provides a view from the World Bank on the gains, and practical ingredients 
of competition policy.  
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•  Vigorous action on provisioning of education, to equip all to participate, including both 
basic education for all, and meritocratic access to higher education (that raises a host of 
institutional design and political questions). 
•  Provisioning of forms of protection of workers from insecurity and abuse that don’t tax 
the capitalist dynamic, and in particular are not linked to the labour contract, but do rely 
on taxing business incomes and the wealth and consumption of all. 
How to shift from “bad” to “good” capitalism? 
In all this the deeper question concerns the circumstances in which societies shift to adopt 
institutions and processes that support more inclusive, more stable and more sustainable forms of 
capitalism, since the above policy lists are largely endogenous.  This is the big question, and is 
taken up after discussion of the functioning of the state.  However, it is still of value to consider 
the proximate policy “choices” just surveyed, and how they relate to the current functioning of 
alternative forms of capitalism.  This is not least because existing narratives often obscure what 
is really happening, whether this is embedded in a “pro-market/capitalist” or “statist” discourse. 
3  The state, social provisioning and human development 
In this part I turn to the behaviour of the state, with a particular focus on direct action affecting 
human development.  At one level this enters traditional domains of state activity for social 
provisioning: the state is often the major actor in a wide set of activities associated with human 
development, especially in the narrower characterization of human development as being 
connected with education, health and other aspects of the management of individual and 
household risks.  After all, the big innovation of the original Human Development Index was to 
add measures of educational and health status, to offset what was then perceived as an excessive 
preoccupation with aggregate income growth.  And a frequent, explicit or implicit, perspective in 
the human development tradition has been around the desirability of greater public action in 
areas such as schooling, health services, water and sanitation and so on. 
However, the underlying focus here is different.  Consistent with the approach to capitalism, the 
issues of interest concern the drivers of the behaviour of the state—viewing specific actions, say 
in providing  schooling services, regulating utilities, provisioning for risks, as endogenous  
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products of how the state functions in response to political and social pressures.  The question is 
not so much whether the state delivers on the latest list of development desirables—conditional 
cash transfers, village education committees, employment guarantee programmes etc.   Such 
designs do matter, as do specific learnings from experience across and within countries.  But 
these are second order to  the incentives, political base, work cultures, rules, capacities and 
checks and balances of different parts  of the  state.  In a simplified account,  a state can be 
oligarchic or inclusive, and this will often parallel the condition of capitalism. 
With this context, of particular interest are the following trends of the past 20 years or so: 
•  The spread of formal, procesual democracy, with the rise (or return) of democracy in 
most of Latin America, its extension in Sub-Saharan Africa, radical shifts in many states 
previously in the Soviet Bloc, and transitions from authoritarian rule in parts of East Asia 
(including Korea in the 1980s, Indonesia in the late 1990s), alongside the sustained 
consolidation of democracy of India. 
•  The rise of local, participatory democratic processes in different forms, including in the 
form of decentralization to local governmental units (in many parts of Latin America, in 
the panchayati raj system of rural India) and the emergence of a powerful narrative in the 
development community, and sometime practice, of citizen participation at the frontline 
of service delivery. 
•  Significant political and social action with respect to identity-based groups, historically 
associated with exclusions and deprivation, including blacks in South Africa, indigenous 
and Afro-Latinos in Latin America, and dalits and adivasis in India 
•  The continued existence (and probable rise) in the intra-state conflict and so-called 
“failed” states—with conflicts often coalescing along identity-based lines 
Alongside all this, has been a more explicit concern with the “accountability” of the state—
sometimes linked specifically to anti-corruption moves, but also, and more importantly, linked to 
a broader interest in state behaviour, sometimes associated with right to information and civil 
society actors.   
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How do these trends, and associated shifts in state-society relations, relate to the success or 
failure in human development?  How to explain the  persistence of fragile and weak state 
functioning? 
It  is useful to frame this in terms  of two kinds of question.  Does the underlying political 
equilibrium support broad-based social provisioning and regulation?  And does the institutional 
(including ideological) and organizational functioning of the state—that is state “capacity”—
support effective delivery and regulation?   There is a parallel with the discussion of the nature of 
capitalism.  The real, long-term question concerns the nature of the political equilibrium, the 
social contract between political and economic elites, and between the elites and various social 
groups, and whether this is consistent with state behaviour that delivers on public goods and 
services that expand opportunity for all; or not, but encourages extractive, predatory, or 
conflictive behaviours.  At a point in time the “capacity” of state actors is a powerful influence 
on what can be done, and whether politically supportable intentions get distorted in the 
implementation process.  “Capacity” is a nebulous concept, and is largely endogenous over the 
long-term, but it matters. 
The remainder of this section presents an interpretation of the first three trends: exploring what 
historical experience indicates on the relationship between political “voice” and social 
provisioning; the role of direct participation; and the effects of politicization of identity-based 
groups. The question of state failure and conflict is returned to in the following integrative 
section on social contracts and typologies. 
“Voice”, or populist  pressures on the state,  are  a primary driver of  social  provisioning—
whether or not this is via formal democracy 
Here’s the thesis: that broad-based social provisioning occurs in response to populist pressure, in 
the sense of politically salient demands from middle and poorer groups on the state to deliver 
core services.  This often implies some redistribution, and works best when there is an effective 
middle-poor alliance.  This applies to all areas of social provisioning, though education also 
faces distinct pressures from the frequent desire of states to inculcate belief systems on the 
population.  “Populism” is used in the broad sense outlined above.   In practice politicians may  
  26 
adopt particular “populist” strategies that emphasize short-term  payoffs to middle and poor 
groups, that do not take account of either fiscal constraints or distortions.  It is this more 
restricted sense that the term is used in Latin American discourse (and often practice), as well as 
elsewhere (India for example).  But this is not necessarily the case.   
Since populist pressure is hard to measure independently, and is only weakly correlated with 
formal democracy, the most persuasive support for this thesis currently derives from historical 
narratives.  An illustrative review follows. 
First, in Lindert’s analysis of the long-term evolution of social provisioning in now-rich 
industrialized societies, the expansion of political influence to working class men and women 
played a central role (Lindert, 2004).  This was also manifest in a steady extension of the vote, 
though that was also to a large degree endogenous to rising political and social demands from 
below, or the  political  necessity of governments to deliver.  Bismarck introduced accident, 
sickness and old age insurance during the 1880s, as a reformist response to the revolutionary 
threat from Germany’s Marxist Social Democratic Party.    The major extension of the British 
welfare state was framed in the Beveridge Report during the Second World War, and introduced 
as part an extended social contract, amid public debate on a “New Jerusalem”, in the wake of the 
collective solidarity and sacrifice that the War had involved.  
Second, in Engerman and Sokoloff’s comparative analysis across the Americas, we again see 
more rapid expansion in the vote in the more inclusive societies, followed by expansion of 
education, and social provisioning for health and social security (see, for example, Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2001, 2002).  The United States (outside the South) and Canada were leaders, followed 
by countries in which European immigration accounted for the bulk of the population 
(Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay) and then by societies that historically had major, 
subordinate populations of indigenous or African  slave origin (Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru).   (Engerman and Sokoloff also have an important thesis on the origins of these 
political differences in terms of differential factor endowments around the critical juncture of 
European colonization, but that is not the focus here.)  
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Third, in twentieth century Latin America up to the present, the pace of catch-up in social 
provisioning, especially of lagging groups, is associated with the salience of political pressures 
from below.  Mexico’s revolution after 1910 provided a major push to broader provisioning in 
the subsequent political resolution—albeit under semi-authoritarian, “corporatist” lines, that also 
involved the preservation of the industrial oligarchy.  In Peru it was manifest in a left-wing 
military coup under General Velasco 1968-1975, though subsequent developmental failures 
nurtured a virtual civil war with guerrilla groups.   Both Mexico and Peru saw significant 
expansions in education, while Mexico developed an extensive social security system for formal 
sector workers.  The 1952 Bolivian revolution was less effective, and major expansion in social 
provisioning was delayed till the 1990s.  Guatemala was caught in a destructive and repressive 
conflict, and expanded provisioning was also substantially delayed till after the 1996 Peace 
Accords. Distributional and political struggles in Brazil were resolved by a right-wing military 
regime from 1964 to 1985: the subsequent return to and consolidation of democracy has been 
associated with a major expansion in social provisioning in the 1990s and 2000s, with the 
massification of education, and emergence of transfer programmes to the poor, such as the Bolsa 
Escola, now Bolsa Família, playing a significant political role. 
Fourth, most East Asian countries developed political resolutions that depended on effective 
delivery to first the peasantry and then urban lower classes.  This occurred both under communist 
auspices—in China and later Vietnam—and in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, where 
the centrality of a peasant political support base, and the threat of communism, were important to 
big pushes on broad-based social provisioning—as well as provisioning of productive services 
for peasant agriculture.  In the latter, non-communist, group such broad-based provisioning 
typically went alongside old and new oligarchic structures—as in Mexico—though with more 
effective provisioning.   
In Africa, the Zimbabwean and South African transitions to democracy led to major expansions 
in social provisioning for poorer groups, including attempts to level up to previously white 
standards in South Africa, for example in old age pension policy.  Zimbabwe’s has subsequently 
gone dramatically and depressingly backward, reflecting the incompleteness of the transition to 
an inclusive polity.  In low-income Sub-Saharan Africa—outside conflict states—there has been  
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steady expansion in social provisioning since independence, but this has often been slow owing 
to the weak state capacity. 
In India, the post-independence ideology of universal provisioning of education and other basic 
services was implemented only slowly for decades, in spite of the importance of the poor vote.  
Especially in Northern States, this partial failure was a product of a state and society caught in 
structures of patronage and historically shaped social difference (PROBE team, 1999).  Where 
social transformation proceeded further, in Southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, social 
provisioning was more extensive.  In the more recent past, the workings of democracy have led 
to elections of political alliances with a mandate for delivery of social and other services to the 
peasantry, that has led to substantial expansions of spending (in good and bad designs). Since the 
mid-1990s there has been large expansion in enrolments, to near-universal enrolment at entry.  
Bihar, one of the poorest and most educationally deprived states is a vivid illustration: following 
a change in power in the state-level 2005 election, there has been a huge expansion on spending 
in Bihar’s schools, with the number of teachers tripling, after decades of neglect.  
Education is also driven by ideological goals 
Education is different from other forms of social provisioning.  Schooling shapes beliefs, as well 
as imparting skills.  Political elites have an interest in the beliefs of other citizens.  Many 
governments have explicitly used education to support the belief systems and forms of 
citizenships that the political elites favour—whether of modernization in Meiji Japan, secular 
principles in Ataturk’s Turkey, republican France and Mexico, or an ideology of cooperation and 
Indonesian nationalism (and not communism) under President Suharto.  This is an important 
reason for governments choosing public delivery over public finance (Pritchett, 2002).  Religion 
can also be a factor, irrespective of government.  Some religions place emphasis (in particular 
phases) on reading.  The Lutheran Reformation pushed reading the bible in the native language, 
as opposed to listening in Latin.  That was good for literacy, and a positive Protestant influence 
on growth, to the extent it existed, may have been mediated via education, as evidenced by inter-
regional variations in Protestantism, literacy and growth within Prussia (Becker and Woessman, 
2010).  (There is, however, effectively no evidence for the general argument for a cultural-
religious influence on long-term growth, but that’s another story; see Sen, 2003).  
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Broad-based intentions on social provisioning can be consistent with specific exclusions and 
inequalities 
Even  where there is a societal deal, including elite support and  de facto government 
commitment,  for some kind of broad-based social provisioning, this can be associated with 
substantial inequalities in access and outcomes across social groups.  A classic example lies in 
the inequalities in social provisioning between the households of formal and informal workers.  
In most developing countries, some form of risk management is embodied in formal labour 
contracts.  For example, Mexico’s formal social insurance system applies to public and private 
workers with contracts.  This includes retirement pensions, health insurance (in dedicated 
hospitals), work-risk insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, day-care for workers’ 
children, sports and cultural facilities and housing loans (Levy, 2008).  Workers without formal 
contracts get much less, and what they get is of lower quality.  Yet this all fell within an ideology 
of inclusive social provisioning, bred of the 1930s resolution of inter-group conflict in the 
Mexican corporatist state.  Of course, organized workers had much more leverage than informal 
ones in the deal—this was underwritten by a narrative of social provisioning that goes back to its 
Bismarckian foundations.  With the transition from a semi-authoritarian system to democracy in 
the late 1990s, there was a marked increase in social programmes for the households of informal 
workers.   
A similar story applies to the formal-informal divide throughout the developing world, though in 
poorer countries (such as India) formal workers are a minority.  In others (many in Sub-Saharan 
Africa) formal social insurance systems collapsed in any case. 
Expanded provisioning works best when aligned with state capacities 
A further consideration is of capacity.  Even where the political equilibrium is supportive of 
broad-based social provisioning, the effectiveness of this depends on alignment with the capacity 
of the state to actually deliver—when the state is the central provider.  In some of the major 
historical successes this was clearly the case.  The expansion of education in the United States 
occurred initially as an essentially local movement, with local demands effectively pressuring 
local governments to deliver education of decent quality to the children of mainly white middle  
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and working class groups (Goldin and Katz, 2008).  The history of black education is, of course, 
thoroughly different, both before and after the Civil War in the South, as dominant white groups 
largely excluded blacks from decent education until the civil rights movement of the 1960s, with 
a continuing heritage today.   I have not reviewed careful analyses of the state education service 
in other big successes, such as Korea and Cuba, but would expect similar conclusions: a close 
alignment between incentives for teaching, internal governmental processes, ideologies of 
educational quality and societal pressure. 
On the other side, many countries have been successful only with those aspects of social 
provisioning that can be undertaken with top-down, often patronage-based,  state systems.  
Education again exemplifies.  Expansion of schools  is relatively easy to do in a top-down 
fashion, and is often politically aligned: teachers unions like expansion, as do contractors.  
Brazil,  India, Indonesia and Mexico  found it  relatively easy to expand enrolments  in basic 
education, when the overall political equilibrium supported this.  However, what has proved to 
be much harder in each of these countries (and elsewhere) is developing the incentives and work 
culture that solves the challenge of getting motivated teachers to impart real learning skills to 
kids.  Solving incentive problems for managers and workers is always hard in the public sector.  
It is especially hard when the state is embedded in patronage-based mechanisms of channelling 
goods and services to core supporters, along the way creating new entrenched groups, with an 
interest in maintaining their rents (in economic language) or opportunity-hoarding (in the 
language of sociologist Tilly, 1998).  (I expand on the role of rents in the final interpretative 
section.)  This is particularly hard when teachers have a premium in salary over alternative 
occupations with similar characteristics, as in India and Mexico, and where there is effective 
resistance to linking performance and career to actual results in school (see Pritchett and Murgai, 
2007, on India). 
The issue of weak state capacity is particularly germane to low income countries, many of which 
are in Sub-Saharan Africa.   As already noted, at a point in time this can be largely exogenous, 
but it is also a product of political and organisational histories, apart from longer-term influences 
of educational investment.  In particular, where governmental systems have shifted into 
relatively extreme, short-term forms of rent-seeking, often exacerbated by falling government 
wages and inter-group distributional struggles, “weak” capacity or effort can become an  
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apparently ingrained feature of the state.  On the other hand, there is evidence of specific 
government services substantially improving their performance in response to better information 
and social pressure.  Two Ugandan examples illustrate: in the first informational campaign on 
how much budgeted money actually arrived in schools had a dramatic  impact  on reducing 
leakage (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005); in a second case, provision of monitoring information 
on public dispensaries provided to local user communities had a significant effect on the effort of 
government workers, utilization and health outcomes (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2010.) 
In other domains, the  general phenomenon is reflected in the classic contrast  between 
investment—relatively easy to build irrigation channels, open water supply and hospitals, where 
there is often alignment with politician incentives and contractors’ profits—and maintenance--
where it is hard to get the incentives systems that keep the water flowing, nurses working well 
and medicines coming. 
State capacities and interests can interact, for good or ill, with institutional design choices 
Sometimes specific design choices make a difference.  A big example is the common policy 
amongst developing countries—from Latin America to Korea—to follow an essentially 
Bismarckian design in the provision of social security, already cited above.  By this I mean 
linking pensions, worker accident insurance and health insurance to labour contracts.  This is bad 
enough when most of the workforce is in formal work.  It is pernicious when most work is 
informal.  This leads to dualistic provisioning, with households dependent on informal work 
often facing little or no formal mechanisms for risk management.  (Yes, there are sophisticated 
informal mechanisms, but these have costs, are bad at dealing with covariate shocks, and suffer 
different patterns of inclusion and exclusion, linked to social status and networks.)  It provides a 
disincentive for firms to offer formal contracts—especially where these have additional costs of 
separation, and where there are minimum wages—and for workers to choose them—especially 
when their valuation of the offered benefits is lower than the cost (Levy, 2008).  And it again 
creates groups with an interest in entrenching their position—both those who receive the 
benefits, and workers on the supply side of the social security system.  In Mexico, for example, 
the social security system for private sector workers (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, or 
IMSS) is one of the biggest employers of its own workers in the country.  The union of IMSS  
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workers fought a fierce political fight in the mid-2000s to maintain benefits substantially higher 
than those received by the private sector workers in the system. 
While the UK’s welfare state is not often cited as a  paragon of efficiency, the underlying 
principle of the Beveridge report, on which the post-Second World War expansion of the welfare 
state was based, was of tax-based, universal provisioning, especially for health, unemployment 
and basic pensions.  Design details matter a lot—and there have been incentive problems in the 
British system—but these core principles offer a better model.   It is unlikely that the designers 
of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme were looking to Beveridge.  But the 
NREGS is an example of a tax-financed design that is aimed precisely at informal rural workers, 
and through provision of a guarantee has potentially good insurance and incentive properties. 
Effects of local participation depend on local context 
Local participation, often linked to greater decentralization to lower levels of government, is a 
second trend that is highlighted here.  It is of interest to this essay as an institutional mechanism 
that will induce greater responsiveness and accountability of government to voters or recipients 
of services.  In a world of rule-bound bureaucracies pursuing the objectives of politicians and 
managers, local participation can be seen as a source of better information on local preferences, 
allowing greater alignment.  However, such a world is far from the typical developing country 
reality.  And the more common rationale is as a source of “empowerment” of citizens, whether 
amongst the poor or non-poor.  This seems consistent with examples such as participatory 
budgeting in Porto Alegre, in which citizens have a direct say in budgetary decisions, or the 
EDUCO (Educacion con Participación de la Comunidad) schooling design in El Salvador, in 
which parent committees have the power over recruiting and firing teachers.   
This is not the place to review the balance of evidence in this area.  I rather want to make two 
points.  First, the effects of either direct participation or decentralization are highly dependent on 
the local social and political context; it is easy for such shifts to get stuck in a local unequal 
equilibrium, as opposed to inducing a shift to a different equilibrium, that is more equitable, or is 
better at delivering public goods.  Second, local functioning is closely connected with national, 
or at least higher level, policy and political processes.  
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Take the case of Porto Alegre.  In-depth studies (Abers, 2000) suggest that this did have 
transformative features on how the city functions and on the nature of interactions between local 
groups and the local state.  There were substantial shifts in expenditure allocations, high levels of 
mobilization, especially in poorer neighbourhoods, evidence of better overall city functioning 
(including higher tax payments), and documentation of participating individuals experiencing a 
sense of psychological empowerment.  But this all has to be seen in a larger context.  Brazil had 
experienced a recent return to democracy.  Changes in national rules led to substantive 
decentralization to cities.  There were well-developed local social movements, emerging from 
the democratization struggle that was relatively encompassing in character.  A left-wing political 
party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, or Worker’s Party), won a local electoral context, and 
then became pragmatic in office.  This was a mix that supported new alliances and strategies 
when the PT came to power—a local critical juncture.  There is some quantitative evidence that 
participatory budgeting has an independent effect when it has been adopted elsewhere in Brazil, 
but measurable impacts are modest rather than transformative.
7
In other cases decentralized social and political structures can be a source of perpetuation of 
inequalities and exclusions.  A classic example is way in which the US South was able to 
reconstitute highly unequal social structures, maintaining subordinate status of blacks, after the 
Civil War—with substantial change coming almost a century later, effected by the interaction 
between social movements and Federal action (Robinson, 2008). 
     
At a more local level, Abrahams and Platteau (2003)  argue, on the basis of a review of 
devolution of funds to local communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, that this typically becomes 
embedded in local socio-cultural practices, whether this involves “traditional” patterns of 
ascribed social position, or patterns of differentiation in social and economic status that occur as 
marketization and economic development proceeds.  Absent other sources of change—from 
external change agents—the most common outcome is reinforcement of existing inequalities and 
practices. 
                                                        
7 The econometric design sought to isolate the effect of participatory budgeting (or rather a 
participatory budgeting plus PT government) through comparing marginal election results in 
which the PT just won or just lost (Baiocchi et al. 2006).    
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There have also been ambiguous effects from the 1993 constitutional change in India that led to a 
formal devolution of political authority to village council (panchayats) with some modest 
budgetary control.  This interacts with the nationally legislated policy of rotating reservation of 
the elected village leadership to women and individuals with scheduled caste or scheduled tribe.  
This has in some cases led to the emergence of new deliberative practices, in which the very 
process of interaction appears to be changing local discourse (Rao and Sanyal, 2008).  There is 
also some evidence of shifts in budget allocations, for example, with elected women leaders 
(Chattopadhay and Duflo, 2004).   But it is still unclear whether this has been a source of local 
transformation.  Also in India, one study finds that the  introduction of village education 
committees as part of a major nationally financed education programme, channelled through the 
states (the next layer of government), had no effect: parents in the study area of Uttar Pradesh 
were essentially ignorant of VECs, and there was no evidence of impacts on outcomes (Banerjee 
et al, 2010, who did, however, find evidence of impact of a volunteer-based teaching in the same 
study). 
A final set of examples also comes from Brazil.  Tendler’s (1997) study of a range of changes in 
the highly unequal, clientelistic state of Ceará, indeed finds substantial improvements in service 
delivery, in health, extension service, small-business, associated with both new cadres of workers 
(the village health workers) and changes in the management of public sector worker groups (e.g. 
extension workers).  This involved shifts in front-line interactions between the government 
workers and the households and communities they served.  She diagnoses this as a product as 
coming very much from interventions from above, from an activist state government (also a 
contingent product of state level elections and representatives of modernizing local elite elements 
coming to power).  Sometimes this involved the external introduction of recruitment practices—
of the VHW cadre—to avoid traditional practices of local clientelistic job allocations. 
Identity-based movements are of rising political salience, and sometimes conflict 
A third trend highlighted here concerns the political position of previously excluded and 
subordinate groups.  The past 20 years or so has witnessed the rise in voice, in political salience, 
of several socio-cultural groups that had historically suffered substantial discrimination—
sometimes referred to as horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2001). These include the transition  
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from apartheid in South Africa, the rise (or re-emergence) of indigenous social movements in 
Latin America, that translated into political parties associated with these movements coming to 
power in Bolivia and Ecuador, and the growing importance of lower caste politics in India, with 
increasing frequency of political power at the state level of parties associated with “other 
backward castes” (outside the Brahmin and merchant elite) and more recently dalits (in the form 
of the BSP, or Bahujan Samaj Party, currently in power in Uttar Pradesh). 
Three issues are of particular relevance to this essay. 
First, political organization—generally under democratic auspices or in democratic transitions—
has been an important feature of this phase in the rise of influence of these groups.  Moreover, 
the dynamics of change seems to be distinct when action flows from political mobilization than 
when from national policy.  As an example, in India Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) find 
relative gains in local public good provision in local areas with significant proportions of 
scheduled castes (dalits) but not scheduled tribes (adivasis).  They suggest this is linked with the 
emergence of political alternatives of the Congress party for dalit voters, that has not effectively 
occurred for adivasis.  Similarly, in Latin America Afro-Latinos have had much less success in 
political organization, and are much less politically visible.  
Second, issues of symbolic recognition matter.  In India again, parties associated with other 
backward castes and dalit-based parties initially put major efforts on policies associated with 
“dignity”.  Alejandro Toledo, the first indigenous president of Peru (and only the second of Latin 
America) held a second inaugural event, involving a traditional ceremony and priests. 
Third, relative economic and social disadvantage is persistent.  This is seen in the continued 
relative position of dalits and adivasis in India, of indigenous groups in Latin America and also 
of blacks in the United States.  Structures of inequality are remarkably persistent.  They are also 
not necessarily dissolved by market/capitalist processes: firms considered modernizing in India 
continue to practice differential higher practices (Thorat and Newman, 2009).  
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4  Interpretation: social contracts, typologies and transitions. 
Let’s return to the major theme of this essay.  It is that success and failure in human development 
is a joint product of capitalist dynamics and state functioning.  However, the big issue is not state 
versus market, or growth versus equity, or dynamism versus security.  It is the jointly determined 
functioning of both capitalism and the state.  This is a consequence of the extent to which both 
capitalist and state behaviour is oligarchic, extractive, exploitative and divisive as opposed to 
being inclusive, innovative, accountable, responsive  and effective at mediating distributional 
conflict.  This can be conceptualised at a point of time in terms of the nature of the political 
equilibrium, or, alternatively, the way in which social contracts work.  This is a product of the 
historically shaped interaction between political and economic elites, and between these and 
various social groups. 
The oligarchic-inclusive contrast should not be seen as a simple dichotomy, any more than state 
v. market.  There is a wide range of configurations.  Furthermore particular designs can of course 
involve some of the classic tradeoffs—of an overbearing state suppressing private initiative, of 
redistributive measures reducing incentives or inducing conflict and so on. Examples of mixes 
suggested in this review include: 
•  Failed  and conflict-ridden states, where there are neither  institutional  or informal 
enforcement mechanisms even to credibly protect  the property rights of  specific 
economic elites, or to manage distributional conflict without violence.  Incentives in this 
context are for short-run predation, extractive endgames and fighting to loot.  
•  Narrow oligarchic regimes  that are functional but involve  highly extractive and 
exploitative  economic structures, necessarily backed by political repression  (Mobutu-
Zaire) 
•  Broader oligarchic regimes with a functional oligarchic capitalism (Brazil, Mexico, the 
Philippines)—sufficient to provide credible commitment for core  investors, but with 
significant levels of capture undercutting dynamism, and with varying, and often dualistic 
levels of social provisioning.  Given the pervasiveness of patronage and clientelistic 
political mechanisms, under  both  authoritarian and democratic auspices,  this is often  
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associated with weak incentives for performance amongst state managers and frontline 
workers. 
•  The non-communist East Asian brand involving a mix of oligarchic capitalism and a state 
beholden to broad-based interests of the peasantry and urban middle and poorer groups. 
The communist countries of China and Vietnam are now effectively in a similar position, 
but arrived there from a different route.  Some East Asian societies—Korea, perhaps 
Taiwan—appear to have made a transition to a more open political system, that could lay 
the basis for true prosperity. 
•  A democratic version  typified by India, contemporary Latin America, many parts of 
Africa, in which procesual democracy  is  overlaid on a mix of oligarchic  and 
entrepreneurial capitalism, with often an added blend of identity-based differences.  
Populist pressures working through formal democracy and other means can support good 
outcomes (broadening of health insurance, NREGS in India, Bolsa Família) but also 
frequently leads to clientelistic policies. 
So how can we think of this range of conditions?  Consider the varying forms of political 
equilibrium as reflecting underlying social contracts between the political and economic elites, 
and between elites and different social groups, with state actors (that partly overlap with political 
elites) playing a central role in this interplay.  The interactions, and associated distributional 
fights, are deeply about processes that create, extract and share economic rents.   The 
(in)stability, incentive and distributional properties are crystallized in institutions—both formal 
and informal, ranging from constraints on behaviours to belief systems. 
A simplified schematic is given in Figure 3.  This is, of course, a large abstraction from a much 
more complex reality.  It  suggests a central channel of causation, from underlying social, 
economic and political processes through social contracts and institutions to human development 
outcomes.  I would highlight three aspects of this formulation: (i) putting some structure on an 
“institutions matter” approach; (ii) using the idea of social contract—as here framed in terms of a 
functioning political equilibrium—as a way of interpreting the underpinning and stability of 
institutional resolutions; and (iii) the role of business and state capacities, that are historically 
formed, but shape options and resolutions. The last point is particularly relevant given an 
organizing prism of the social contract for two inter-related arrangements, between state and  
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capitalists, and between state and social groups.  Of course, there are different types of 
capitalists—large scale, foreign, informal—and there are definitely different social groups—
middle households, working classes, groups with a socially stigmatized, inferior or exclusionary 
identities—and so on.  This all matters, but I want to start with a more parsimonious account. 
Figure 3.  A simplified schematic of causal processes 
Source: author 
With this framing, I discuss a set of issues around the nature of the social contract that shapes 
economic and social dynamics.   This is done in three parts: first I pose some questions around 
the big issues; then turn to the vexed question of typologies in relation to human development 
progress; and finally I consider transitions. 
On social contracts between the state, capitalists and social groups: some questions  
Can the state, and political elites, credibly commit not to expropriate the property rights of 
(some) investors? 
In their historical analysis of Mexico during and after the revolutionary period, Haber et al 
(2003) argue that this central issue starts from a core paradox: that a state that is strong enough to 
protect property rights is also strong enough to expropriate them—that is to renege on a 
commitment.  The long-term resolution of this problem is seen in now-rich countries in the 
functioning of effective, politically supported, institutions that limit opportunistic government 
behaviour, including checks and balances from legislatures, judiciaries, sometimes state rights, 
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rich countries, as the distorting influence of interests in the US in finance and health vividly 
illustrates.  Nevertheless, they have worked well enough to support transitions to high levels of 
prosperity.  However, transplanting the organizational form of such structures will be 
meaningless if inconsistent with the internal social contract.  Haber et al argue that resolutions in 
Mexico occurred through the emergence of third-party enforcers, that in some phases were quite 
contingent (military groups, favoured worker unions), but became increasingly institutionalized 
over time in the formation of corporatist structures that led to some automaticity in rent-sharing 
for the various groups.  Rent creation and rent-sharing lie at the heart of this, to ensure groups 
with the power to disrupt have a stake in existing arrangements.  An analogous story could be 
told on the deal struck in Indonesia between the Soeharto-led military regime and the Chinese 
business groups—large rents were created and shared between these groups, and both sides had 
the capacity punish the other: the Chinese through capital flight, given the opening of the capital 
account at the beginning of the Soeharto era.   The issue is not the particular form of the, often 
implicit, contract.  It is that absent resolution of this issue of credibility in commitment the 
prospects of substantial private investment are dim.   The mechanisms vary.  And often they will 
only apply to certain groups, as established capitalists in Mexico, or to particular spatial areas, 
such as extractive enclaves in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, that Ferguson (2006) argues is 
a central feature of the form in which globalization is manifest in many countries of this region. 
What do alternative resolutions imply for the time horizon of elite behaviour? 
This is a specific aspect of the credible commitment issue.   The social contracts that evolved in 
Mexico under the PRI, in Indonesia under Soeharto, in Thailand until the recent period of 
turbulence, in India and China over decades, have been consistent with political and economic 
elites having long-term time horizons.  This has typically been backed by nationalist ideology 
and associated belief systems.  There is certainly short-term rent extraction along the way.  In 
some cases authoritarian or repressive action can stoke longer-term grievances.  But there is also 
credible commitment from the state to investors, including over the management of the part of 
the social contracts that relate to social groups.  An interesting African example is that of 
Ethiopia: the semi-authoritarian regime that has involved under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is 
controversial because of disputed elections and accusations of bias toward certain groups.   
However, most observers would agree that Zenawi has the goal of being in charge for the long  
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haul, with the economic and social transformation of Ethiopia as central objective. Whether this 
government has solved issues of credible commitment to private investors and distributional 
conflict is another matter. 
What is the balance between extractive rent-sharing with cronies and incentives for dynamic rent 
creation? 
This is related to, but distinct from, the time horizon question.  The Philippines and Mexico have 
for a long time been societies in which the nature of the rent creation and rent-sharing was 
closely tied to the creation of monopoly rents, that involve extraction or exploitation of other 
groups.  These were resolutions with long-term time horizons and so could sustain slow growth, 
and were associated with unequal political structures.  Mexico now represents more of a mixture: 
competitive sectors exposed to internal and international competition, especially via NAFTA, 
and a range of de facto nontradable sectors with substantial monopoly rents.  Many of the latter 
are associated with Mexican billionaires.  Now these probably have long time horizons but are 
effective at extracting rents from firms and citizens in Mexico.  Other resolutions involve short-
term extraction and sharing—especially in a situation of conflict or uncertainty (Pakistan today?)  
So the really interesting question is what will induce the state and business to shift their social 
contract to one that involves open economic institutions and incentives for pursuit of 
Schumpeterian rents?   
Is the resolution for political and economic elites associated with  extractive  or inclusive 
relations with middle and subordinate social groups?  And how do they credibly commit to 
provision for such groups? 
This is fundamentally the story of social pressure from middle and subordinate groups, linked in 
the now-industrialized countries to the steady evolution of democracy, and also associated with 
the threat of revolution.  The discussion of the relationship between voice and social 
provisioning above exemplifies this.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have argued that elites 
agree to democracy as a commitment device—otherwise the masses will not find credible the 
introduction of policies for sharing of wealth, consumption or services in the current period.     
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Throughout East Asia, the political success of communism in China proved a powerful spur to 
non-communist countries to deliver material and social benefits to the peasantry. 
What is the balance between clientelistic relations and provision of public goods for different 
social groups? 
At one level the form in which provisioning of goods and services is a more subtle issue—
second order to whether political elites commit to deliver to middle and poorer groups.  But it is 
both pervasive and fundamental.  A clientelistic resolution is  the  most common, seemingly 
natural, equilibrium for long phases of development.  This involves a reciprocal relation: goods 
or services for political support, whether in the form of votes or other mechanisms of providing 
loyalty.  This may involve private goods for favoured groups, such as in public sector jobs.  For 
example, in negotiations over group, or even family-based, grievances in India, it is common to 
demand, and receive, a public sector job guarantee.  It can also involve “club” goods to particular 
villages, slums or groups, such as roads, water supply, promises to regularize and so on. 
Clientelistic inclusion is not all bad, since it does at least bring poorer groups into the political 
system and provide services.  It was an important form of inclusion of immigrants into US cities, 
for example.  But it is typically unequal and asymmetric, embedded in a contemporary form of 
patron-client relations, and tends to undercut the independent agency of social groups.   Of equal 
importance is the bias against provision of general public goods, whether at the local or regional 
level.  Classic transitions occur with the emergence of more programmatic parties, but effecting 
change during the development process can be hard.  Stokes (1995) has a fascinating discussion 
of the transition from a clientelistic political culture to rights-based approaches to seeking service 
provision from the state in Peruvian slums in the 1980s (though this was swept aside by the 
authoritarian populism of Fujimori).  In terms of the capacities of subordinate groups, this is 
closely linked to Appadurai’s concept of “the capacity to aspire” that he developed based on 
observation of processes of social activism in Mumbai’s slums: this is an essentially culturally-
based capacity to conceive, envision and act upon trajectories of social change, built by group-
based action in struggles for both practical services and rights, ranging from toilets to legal 
recognition (Appadurai, 2003).  
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How is conflict managed? 
The issue of how conflict between groups is managed is at one level the first order issue—
whether this is between business and labour, or between different identity-based groups.  North 
et al (2007) build a whole conception of modernization in terms of the management of threats of 
violence by the state.  This obviously matters for societies in violent conflict.  It is also relevant 
to non-violent conflicts, for example around loss allocations in the wake of shocks: Rodrik 
(1999) argues in an empirical treatment that long-term growth impact of macroeconomic shocks 
of  the 1970s and 1980s  were mediated by the interaction between underlying societal 
polarization and conflict management mechanisms: countries with high levels of polarization and 
weak mediation structures—typified by Latin America in the 1980s—suffered long-term growth 
costs. 
How institutionalized are checks and balances on opportunistic behaviour, both in the sense of 
formalization of institutions and incentives (from punishment or social internalization) to respect 
them? 
Rapid human development is clearly feasible in the absence of consolidated, open political and 
economic institutions, as many examples of rapid advances under oligarchic capitalism and 
authoritarian political institutions illustrate.  But these are argued here to be intrinsically 
fragile—contingent on the incentives and capacities to enforce punishment of opportunistic 
behaviour by different groups, or of the state to maintain control.  Where these are robust, and 
credible, this can last for decades—as with Indonesia under Soeharto, Korea under authoritarian 
auspices, Brazil under the generals and so on (through to China now?)  But real long-term 
change depends on institutional consolidation—in other words in the formation of institutions 
that crystallize incentives and punishment mechanism both through formal structures, and often 
in internalized social norms.  One interpretation of the “middle income trap” is of the failure to 
effect this transition.  But this is not just a step on a modernization path.  Such institutional shifts 
are also relevant for poorer countries: consider, for example, the emerging role of social audits in 
India, that is designed to play a central role in the recent National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, as a means of preventing re-capture by alliances between corrupt local state officials 
and corrupt contractors.  Again, what is of interest is not finding institutional tricks that can be  
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transplanted, but understanding the circumstances and designs that will support such institutional 
consolidation.  Think of central bank independence—a favourite example of desirable 
institutionalization.  Yet both anecdote (Argentina and Zimbabwe have, or had, independent 
central banks) and empirical work (Acemoglu et al. 2008) suggests this worked only when 
politically supported. 
Typologies—of functionalities not form 
Let’s now take an integrated view on the varieties of institutional structures.  The central notion 
is that sustainable success—whether in terms of capitalist dynamics or social provisioning—
depends on a working social contract, or rather (in the stylized partition used here) in two social 
contracts, between the state and capitalists, and between the state and middle and poorer social 
groups.  The form of these social contracts varies, but the function is common—a credible, long-
term commitment to deliver by the state, implying that this in the long-term interests of political 
elites, that conflicts can be managed, that opportunistic behaviour will be costly and that there is 
good-enough capacity to deliver—on the part of the state, and, indeed, by capitalists.  This 
characterization focuses on the existence and enforceability of social contracts—the second box 
in Figure 3. 
Now can anything sensible be said with respect to patterns of international experience?  A simple 
formulation of the thesis is as follows: a functioning state-business social contract is conducive 
to capitalist dynamics and a functioning state-social group social contract is good for social 
provisioning; capitalist dynamics and social provisioning then interact in the determination of 
income and non-income dimensions of long run human development.  The problem is that it is 
hard to get an objective, exogenous measure of such social contracts.  In recent empirical 
explorations of the relevance of institutions (e.g. Acemoglu et al 2004,  Banerji and Iyer, 2005) 
there has been exploitation of historical accidents and credible associations between correlates of 
“institutions” and some exogenous factor.  But that tells us little or nothing about mechanism.  
Thus the heuristic emphasis here on (highly abbreviated) accounts of narratives—Haber et al 
(2003)’s in-depth account of Mexico being an exemplary case.  But since this is an essay, I’ll 
continue to make speculative comments on patterns.  
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Take a categorization of dynamic patterns using a division of the human development index 
between growth in incomes per capita and the (remaining) index of health and education.  
Appendix 1 provides a four-way partition of country experiences between 1970 and 2007 from 
the Human Development Report office, organized in terms of outcomes over time, and divided 
between cases that were above the median on both dimensions (a “virtuous” development 
process), neither (a “vicious” process), only health and education (an “HD lopsided” process) 
and only growth in incomes per capita (a “growth lopsided” process).  This categorization has 
similarities in spirit to that used by Drèze and Sen (1991) that was in preparation in parallel to 
first Human Development Report, and was based on in-depth country narratives with a strong 
emphasis on considerations of security-related provisioning.  Drèze and Sen used the term 
“growth-mediated security” to characterize development paths in which growth went along with, 
and helped  support, strategies of broad-based social provisioning,  “support-led security” for 
cases in which direct action occurred prior to, or in the absence of, major growth, and “unaimed 
opulence” for countries that prioritized growth and neglected the security for the population.   
“Virtuous” processes. 
This happy mix would be expected to involve credible commitment, a state with enough 
countervailing power to avoid predatory capitalist practices, good-enough capacity of business 
and state,  a socio-political resolution for broad-based provisioning,  a capacity to manage 
distributional conflict and enough pressures structural change and innovation.  It will typically 
involve rents and rent-sharing—indeed rent-sharing, between political and economic elites, and 
between competing social groups, will typically be functional to the political equilibrium, that is 
to the stability of the social contracts.  
Let’s look at the long, outcome-based list from the HDR to see if there is any correspondence 
with this mix.  This includes both communist (China and Vietnam) and non-communist East 
Asian successes, as expected.  It also includes all the more stable Latin American countries, 
including Brazil, that was actually an exemplar of “unaimed opulence” for Drèze and Sen. Then 
there are South Asian cases (India, Bangladesh and Nepal), the more successful North African 
and Middle Eastern cases (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt), Turkey, plus Laos and Cambodia.  The list  
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covers stars and those just above the median, so there’s a lot of variation. But there’s a plausible 
case to be made that the majority of these fit the story developed here. 
The communist successes of China and Vietnam have a long-term political and ideological 
resolution in favour of broad-based social provisioning for the masses.
8
Non-communist East Asian countries include the  classic stars.  I would highlight here the 
diversity in the form of the resolutions, with the two examples of Korea and Indonesia.  Korea is 
an exemplar of Evans “embedded autonomy”, thick with economic and political rents, with 
government-chaebol cooperation at the core.  A powerful executive, and effective bureaucracy 
countervailed oligarchic capitalist structures, and supported a combination of domestic economic 
rents with pressures for external competition and innovation by the chaebol.  At the same time 
there was enormous social and political pressure for economic and social advance, driven by the 
communist threat and the aspiration to catch up (not least with Japan).  Strong social pressures 
supported practical resolutions of high quality social provisioning, both over the long term (with 
excellent education) and in protection in the wake of the East Asian crisis.  The seeds of this 
crisis lay in the downside of the oligarchic capitalistic structure of the chaebol: weak 
governancee, resilience to takeover, and lack of disciplining from market or  institutional 
shareholders.  As they expanded, their relative power rose, in relation to state-owned banks and 
bureaucracy, and this allowed them to borrow cheaply, at home and abroad, to support ambitious 
expansion plans.
  The shift of the past 30 
years has been to get their own version of resolution of the credible commitment problem with 
private, or private-like, investors.    Business deals may often be murky, and corruption is 
widespread, but returns on investments are generally secure, governments deliver on local public 
goods, and costs of doing business are reasonably low by international standards.  There is 
tremendous  capitalist dynamism in  a  blend of oligarchic, state-owned and small-scale 
entrepreneurial forms. 
9
                                                        
8 There are of course many issues, for example around the stagnation of health indicators post-
1990 and the differential treatment of internal migrants in China, but the intention is to give a 
broad assessment; moreover these, undoubted, problems have not threatened the social contract 
in this period. 
  The social contract between state and capitalists had continued to support 
9 For a summary interpretation see Johnson and Kwak (2010)  
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dynamism, but had by the 1990s also underwritten excessive risk-taking, in addition to an array 
of rent-sharing and intermingling amongst elites.   
Indonesia had a more conflictive post-independence history, that reached a head in the social 
conflagration of the mid-1960s.  Out of this emerged a new political equilibrium that supported 
economic and social advance for almost four decades.  The deal between political-military elites 
and the Chinese capital was at the core of the first social contract; at its core was a self-enforcing 
deal in which each could credibly punish the other party.  It is obvious that the government could 
expropriate the Chinese business.  But Chinese capital could also threaten to flee the country, 
and the Soeharto government’s early decision to open the capital account made this threat more 
credible.  It was indeed acted upon at critical moments in Indonesian history.  With respect to 
social provisioning, the regime had a political necessity (given the communist threat) and also an 
ideology of delivery and local social reliance.  While government capacities were weak, and 
corruption institutionalized, the state was good enough to deliver on schools, roads, health clinics 
etc, if not so good at solving quality problems.  Rent extraction and sharing was a feature 
throughout, and almost certainly became worse in the 1990s, as opportunities increased and 
checks and balances diminished, and this laid the base for the bursting of the political bubble in 
the East Asian crisis, that fostered the subsequent transition to democracy. 
So how do Latin American countries compare?  Given their reputation for high inequality and 
macroeconomic instability there membership in the “virtuous” group may be a surprise.  Of 
course, this group includes both stars and more regular performers.  However, from the 
perspective of this essay, three things are relevant. 
First, many Latin American countries did indeed successfully resolve the credible commitment 
problem for significant parts of the 20
th century, often in the context of restructured alliances 
(and intermingling) between political elites and the emerging industrial elites. That is at the core 
of story of Mexico that is developed in depth by Haber and co-authors (2003, 2006), with 
parallels in the other more stable countries of the region.  Brazil and Mexico both had their 
miraculous growth.  Much of Latin America is middle income precisely because of such a 
historical resolution.  
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Second, this resolution had (at least) two typical weaknesses. It was overlaid on distributional 
struggles—weaknesses in the second social contract—that led to periodic bursts of short-run 
populism, not least in its macroeconomic incarnation that led to  national debt crises.  And 
second, the checks and balances, whether from the state or economic institutions, were weak—
leading to a bias toward rent-extraction and sharing of monopoly rents over creative-destruction.  
This worked relatively well in import-substitution phases, but not beyond, and also slowed the 
development of more vibrant business capacities.  This is an important factor behind the “middle 
income trap” illustrated for Mexico in Figure 1.  Washington Consensus type reforms can help, 
but often did not tackle the fundamental weakness of this state-business social contract. 
Third, the state-society social contract in favour of broad-based social provisioning—always 
strong in Costa Rica and Uruguay, and half-hearted in Mexico—became more salient with the 
transition to democracy.  Brazil is an interesting case here.  Apart from extreme income 
inequality, it also lagged dramatically in educational status through the 1980s.  The transition to 
democracy was based on a broad-based coalition of social groups, and reflected in the new 1988 
constitution, that affirmed an array of social rights.  Brazil also has a reasonably high degree of 
state capacity.  The fall out was a steady expansion in social provisioning over the 1990s and 
2000s, in, for example, the social pension for farmers, the massification of basic education, and 
the experimentation and spread of conditional cash transfers, latterly in the form of the Bolsa 
Família under the government of President Lula da Silva.  Even income inequality has fallen 
significantly in the 2000s. 
India provides a further example—common functionalities, different forms and histories.  Here 
the post-independence resolution was ideologically in favour of redistribution and broad-based 
social provisioning.  It was also increasingly statist, in terms of selective state-ownership and 
regulation of a family-based business sector with substantial, historically formed capacity.  The 
irony is that both social contracts did poorly in implementation.  Social provisioning was slow, a 
consequence of entrenched inequalities, distributional fights, and a patronage-driven public 
service.  (It was indeed better in the Southern states, where some of the distributional fights, in 
favour of the advance of lower caste groups, were resolved earlier.)  Capitalist dynamics were 
also slow, caught in the web of license raj, channelling energy into rent extraction and rent-
sharing within this constrictive frame.  The transition to a “pro-business” position, with the 1991  
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macroeconomic crisis and liberalization a point of inflexion, marked a shift in the implicit social 
contract with business, that also induced substantial new entry, major innovations, alongside a 
substantial increase in profit shares, a surge in the number of billionaires and concerns over the 
influence of the business oligarchy.  In the social domain, democratic process has put consistent 
pressure to tackle inefficiencies and inequities in social provisioning, and, especially in the 
2000s, has led to major expansions in basic schooling, signature programmes for risk 
management, including the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, but still suffers from 
deep problems of a “weak” state, whether due to the mix of patronage and a system with little of 
no incentives to actually deliver services to clients. 
Other cases represent more of a mix.  Bangladesh looks like a genuine exception to the story 
here: substantial progress despite a weak, corrupt state.  There has been sufficient credibility in 
commitment to some labour-intensive industries, notably in garments, despite poor public good 
provision.  But the more remarkable story is how NGOs, such as BRAC, have managed to fill the 
vacuum of state ineffectivess in many areas of social provisioning.  Nepal is an interesting case 
of a country seemingly mired in conflict that nevertheless made rapid progress.  Its success 
makes sense in terms of very low starting conditions, severe social injustice and a quasi-feudal 
oligarchic system, that met rising expectations and mobilisation, with the Maoist insurgency the 
violent end of this.  Political support for expanded social provisioning was, in part, a defensive 
response—backed by high levels of donor activity.  A “weak” state was good enough to deliver 
big gains, especially in education, in the relatively easy stuff of getting kids into school.  This 
was accompanied by steady, unspectacular growth, despite continued uncertainty and the 
dominance of a local business oligarchy.   Finally, the cases around the Mediterranean plausibly 
had a political imperative to deliver to their populations, yet also had a functioning arrangement 
with their private sectors, but this would require further investigation. 
“HD lopsided” 
Drèze and Sen’s theme of “support-led security” carried the message that broad-based social 
provisioning was practically feasible at low levels of development via state action; it was not 
necessary to wait for growth.  Exemplary cases were China, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, Chile and 
Cuba, all of whom had unusually good social indicators for their income levels.  Many of these  
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have since transited to “virtuous” paths.  Cuba is a case of a growth failure that nevertheless did 
remarkably well on education and health. Those on the new list also look more like cases that 
had an internal social contract that led to social provisioning, backed by “good-enough” state 
capacity, but that have been long-term growth failures.  The Latin American cases—Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua—all have experienced democratic transitions, and 
associated pushes on social provisioning, but have suffered from a combination of major 
distributional conflicts, around identity and class, and longer term histories of small, oligarchic 
family control of both economy and polity.  That’s a tough basis on which to reconstruct the 
social contract with business in favour of stability, innovation and dynamism.  The Middle 
Eastern and North African cases have either weak or antagonistic capitalist traditions.  The 
current Iranian regime was born in reaction to an unequal oligarchic precursor, and has combined 
being restrictive of capitalist advance with a substantial effort to deliver to middle and lower 
social groups; evident, for example, in the large gains in education, for both women and men.  
Philippines is a classic case of oligarchic economic dominance, but a long history of relatively 
good social provisioning, especially in education. 
 “Growth lopsided” 
This group also looks rather different from the “unaimed opulence” category of Drèze and Sen.  
In fact it is dominated by two categories. First there are former communist countries who had 
initially very high levels of human development in terms of education and health, and 
experienced (eventually) some growth recovery.  The lopsidedness is a function of their being 
slower potential for health and education advance, or, in some cases (e.g. health in Russia) a 
stalling of progress.  Second, there are Southern African countries who have been hard hit by 
HIV/AIDS: Botswana, for example, would surely have been a star of the “virtuous” category, 
with a plausible institutional story to explain this (see Acemoglu et al, 2003) if it weren’t for the 
awful retrogression in mortality induced by this epidemic 
“Vicious” processes. 
These countries did poorly on both growth and the education and health components of human 
development. They are strikingly dominated by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, though there is  
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also Argentina (who periodically produce the best footballer in the world, but win the World Cup 
less often) and Lebanon (caught in the maelstrom of Middle East conflict). 
So what can be said about Sub-Saharan Africa from the perspective of this essay?    This requires 
a much more extensive discussion than is feasible here, but I think the prism of distorted and 
unstable social contracts can be a useful organizing principle. 
Let’s start with the extreme cases.  How do states suffering histories of violent internal conflict—
that often also fall into the category of so-called “failed states”—fit within this story?  They have 
been a major feature of the past 20 years or so, and represent the most extreme forms of failure in 
human development.  One of the trends in the literature of the past decade of so has been to view 
conflicts  as driven by the possibility of capturing lootable resources—that provide both the 
incentive to fight and the resources to finance conflict.  This is sometimes contrasted with the 
origins of conflict in historically-shaped grievances, that characteristically fall along lines of 
identity- or class-based groups, even if in practice both types of influence are present in the most 
cases of conflict.
10
From the perspective of this essay, both the greed and grievance account is not the central issue.  
It is rather that conflict-ridden and failed states represent extremes of failure in a sustainable 
social contract between different elite and social groups.  This is often associated with extreme 
forms of predatory behaviour by elites and with the mobilization of identity-based groups along 
lines of historical grievances.   The real issue concerns understanding how a political equilibrium 
can occur that supports distributional allocations and conflict-management mechanisms that 
manage underlying conflicts without this spilling over into group-based violence 
  
The important point here is see civil wars not as features of aberrant countries but as a 
consequence of a more general phenomenon of the nature of state formation in much of Africa.  
Take the approach of Azam (2001, 2005), who argues that many African states have rent-sharing 
between competing groups—often identity-based, ethnic groups—as the central mechanism for 
maintaining a peaceful equilibrium.  Historically rents were often extracted from the rural sector, 
                                                        
10 There’s a big literature here: Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue the greed story, though their 
work has also been extensively criticized.  
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from black markets, or corruption in major projects, whether in mining or infrastructure. But the 
stability of such a systemic division of the spoils depends on whether the group in power, often 
embodied in the person of the President, is able to credibly commit to sustain the rent-sharing 
amongst groups.  This sharing includes direct sharing of private rents, in the form of positions or 
other advantages, for the elites from different ethnic group, and a judicious redistribution of 
development projects to different regions (albeit often layered with corruption).  In Côte 
d’Ivoire, President Houphouët Boigny was reportedly a master at using the  state for such 
managed redistribution of rents, and had the credibility deliver on this.  This laid the basis for 
some years of steady expansion in growth and other dimensions of human development, albeit at 
slow pace, owing to the fundamentally rent-extracting nature of the economic and political 
system.  Where leaders used their command over the state to limit rent-sharing to their own 
groups—as with Milton Obote and Idi Amin in Uganda—this stoked the fires of future violence.  
However, even functioning rent-sharing systems can be fragile, especially when there are 
transitions of power, through death or election.  In this account the transition from decades of 
political stability to conflict in Côte d’Ivoire makes sense: with the death of Houphouët Boigny 
the credibility of the state also went, and fights over rents spilled over into violence. 
Underlying this account is the nature of many, perhaps most, African states.  The core idea (see 
van de Walle, 2001) is what has become known as the neopatrimonial character of the state: this 
involves a blend of patrimonialism, in the sense of deeply clientelistic practices, often embodied 
in the personalized leadership of groups, with rational-bureaucratic elements.  However, unlike 
forms of clientelism in Latin America (or, for that matter, in the machine politics of US cities), 
the state elites have a substantial degree of autonomy in extracting and sharing resources: the 
problem is the lack of deep embeddedness in societal actors.  This has further reacted nastily 
with the long-term macroeconomic problems and associated reform efforts to undercut state 
capacity: the civil services has always been a favourite vehicle for the exercise of patronage, but 
this combined with failures in revenue collection (itself linked to opportunities for private rent 
extraction) to produce a fiscal crisis, the collapsing public sector wages of the 1990s, and a 
further debilitation of state capacity. 
A final ingredient of the malaise is relatively weak indigenous business capacity.  There is an 
abundance of small-scale business dynamism, but (outside South Africa) much more limited  
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development of organized African business—indeed a deficit of oligarchic capitalism!  This 
reflected the depredations of colonial history, the fact that more successful business groups were 
often themselves of ethnic origins outside the political core (e.g. Indian, or Lebanese) and the 
more recent post-independence history, in which rent-extraction and failures in public good 
provision were the norm, and credible commitment to capitalist expansion short in supply.  
Periods in which ideologies of African Socialism essentially overlaid rent-extracting and sharing 
systems also didn’t help.  
In sum,  where social contracts were functional to political stability they were embedded in 
redistribution across groups, and especially within elites.  Moreover, they can be fragile, and can 
tip over into conflict.  Credible commitment for capitalist expansion is difficult under these 
conditions.  Or it is confined to resource-extracting enclaves, that are often spatially isolated 
from the bulk of the nation—in contrast even to past African experience, in for example, the 
Zambian copper towns (Ferguson, 2006).  Weak state capacity is often endogenous to  the 
neopatrimonial functioning of the state, adding a further twist to vicious cycles.   Long-term 
effects of democratization may turn this around, but the path remains unclear.  However, absent 
construction of more effective social contracts for capitalism and social provisioning “reform” 
efforts are likely to be disappointing at best, and distorted at worst. 
Transitions 
How does a society transition to a better or worse state, or, in the language of this essay, to social 
contracts with capitalists and social groups that are more favourable to large, equitable advances 
in human development?  This is a massive question, and I’ll make just a few comments at this 
stage. 
As a general proposition, shifts in the social contract will only become feasible when 
underpinned by changes in some of the conditioning factors—those listed in the first box of 
Figure 3: economic structures, the nature and salience of social groups, political processes and 
belief systems.  This may sound either banal or deterministic, but I think it does help as a way 
into exploring particular cases.  Here are three examples. 
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First, late 19
th Century United States feature the rise of the “robber barons”, dynamic oligarchs 
who made massive fortunes, from the railroads, oil and other means, and created monopolistic 
“trusts”.  These were eventually broken. But this involved a happy coalition of populist political 
movements and an active executive branch of government (notably President Teddy Roosevelt) 
with a mandate for change that laid the basis for the anti-trust movement (Robinson, 2009).  It 
also involved a functioning judiciary—with key decisions being made by the Supreme Court.  A 
combination of  political processes, social movements and belief systems on the nature of 
capitalism, were relevant here. 
Second, take the decisions over liberalization and privatization in Mexico.  The debt crisis of 
1982 represented the combination of eventual decline in dynamism of Mexico’s capitalism—in a 
state and oligarchic blend with insufficient incentives for innovation—and emergent populist 
pressures, temporarily resolved by increased borrowing.  The interesting question is why an 
oligarchic business community, traditionally wedded to protecting the club, agreed to support the 
radical opening associated with joining of NAFTA.  The political economy story was that such 
opening constituted a commitment device—badly needed in the wake of statist interest groups 
and the 1982 banking expropriations: opening to external competition was the quid pro quo for 
the substantially increased guarantees against expropriation by the state (Tornell and Esquivel, 
1995).  Unfortunately the privatizations of the parts of the state not open to external competition 
created an array of monopolies, and indeed a number of billionaires, including Carlos Slim, in 
2010 the world’s richest man.  Change did occur, but the new equilibrium is far from optimal: 
parts are embedded in a restructured social contract with business in which new oligarchs have 
substantial power, benefiting from, and indeed with an interest in, the continued regulatory and 
judicial “weakness” of the state.  Meanwhile, the deepening of democracy has led to shifts in the 
social contract with social groups, but this has often gone into inefficient and clientelistic forms 
of social programmes (Levy and Walton, 2008). 
Third, Spain in the 20
th Century experienced both the devastating civil war of the 1930s and an 
economically, socially and political successful transition to democracy, the rule of law and 
consolidated social rights.  The civil war was a consequence of a highly polarized society, 
failures in earlier modernization and, in the end, victory for established elites in an essentially 
zero-sum fight of distribution of wealth.  The later transition was in part based on a  
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modernization and opening that started around 1959 (in the wake of a macroeconomic crisis) and 
led to sustained growth, reduced inter-regional inequality, and created new urban-based working 
class and professional interests.  After Franco’s death, a swift and successful transition to 
democracy was engineered.   But an important part of the deal was the restructuring of the social 
contract, with a major expansion in social provisioning.  Also important was the prospect of 
entering the Economic Union, that provided a powerful spur to opening, with the associated 
competition transforming important parts of Spanish capitalist structures. (Boix, 2008, World 
Bank, 2005, pps 105-106, Rajan and Zingales, 2003.) 
5  Concluding thoughts on policy 
This essay has argued for an approach to interpreting economic and social change in terms of 
how social and economic institutions function.  The particular focus has been on the nature of 
capitalism and the functioning of the state: these are central drivers of success or failure in 
human development, and are in turn shaped by the underlying social contract, and historically 
formed capacities in the business and state sectors.  So what does imply for policy design? 
At one level, this approach takes us to a critique of two common approaches to policy design: the 
technocratic fix, that assumes a well-functioning state and regulatory system; and the 
transplanted institutional solution.  Both can be irrelevant or are likely to be distorted by the 
prevailing conditions of political and social forces and state capacity and functioning. 
However this does not mean that nothing can be done.  It rather pushes the policy design 
question into two complementary domains.  First, what policy design is aligned with the existing 
political equilibrium?  Second, what can be done that could shift the overall political equilibrium 
to one that is more favourable to equitable development, in the sense of fostering Schumpeterian 
rent-creation, dynamic, inclusive, well-regulated capitalism and good enough states in terms of 
service provision, innovation and accountability? 
Occasionally there will be genuine critical junctures, in which societies go through major 
transitions, whether due to external shocks or the cumulative effect of internal processes of social 
and political changes.  Transitions to democracy and resolutions of conflicts are often 
emblematic of the latter: South Africa in the 1990s, Brazil in the 1980s, Mexico in the late  
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1990s, Indonesia after 1966 and again after 1998, Nepal after the accord with the Maoists and 
removal of the monarchy, Guatemala after the Peace Accords.  Less dramatic shifts can occur 
through normal electoral transitions, such as the election of President Evo Morales in Bolivia, 
with an explicit mandate in favour of indigenous interests, and the election of the coalition 
around the Congress party in India in 2004 (and 2009), with a mandate for a shift to greater 
social provisioning. 
While such points of transition present opportunities, policymaking in times of transition can be 
complex, because vested interest can re-group, new actors can move into established positions of 
advantage, and organizational responses can be unpredictable.  The very mixed results of Big 
Bang reforms in countries in transition from communism in the Soviet bloc, illustrate the hazards 
of radical policy shifts in transitional institutional environments.  
In practice policy innovations may fall in interesting grey areas: sufficiently aligned with 
prevailing institutions to be workable, but also with opportunities to effect gradual changes that 
can, offer time, effect changes in how capitalism or the state functions.    Let’s take two 
examples, one relating to capitalism and one to social provisioning.  
First, consider  the India deregulation.  There was an inflection point around the 1991 
macroeconomic crisis, that is often characterized as the moment of opening.   But the more 
interesting story is longer term.  India has a very long tradition of entrepreneurial activity, with 
well-established business families and networks.  Many business families supported the 
independence movement, and were politically aligned with the post-independence governments.  
During the License Raj period, the state shifted to a pattern of extreme over-regulation: this 
restricted activities of the corporate activities, but without generally threatening the overall 
contract between the state and domestic business interests.  A deregulation process then started 
in the 1980s—what has been characterized as a shift to a “pro-business” orientation (Kohli, 
2006; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004) in part at least as a strategy of accelerating growth.  The 
1990s liberalisation involved both removing restrictions on corporate activity and a steady 
opening to foreign competition—in effect reducing regulatory burdens in return for pressures on 
efficiency.  It is also interesting that there has been no reversal: in the critical initial period there 
was some contingency to this, since the secular left was more concerned about the rise of Hindu  
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Nationalist movement than market opening.  The evidence on entry into new sectors, on general 
churning, on capitalists emerging from different groups, and on profit determination supports the 
view that this phase of capitalism has been dynamic, despite the continued importance of both 
publicly owned companies and business groups in the sector.
11
Second, take the introduction of conditional cash transfers in Mexico under the PROGRESA 
(now  Oportunidades) programme.  Social programmes had historically  been embedded in a 
clientelistic political system.  A political opportunity for change was created by a combination of 
the  assassination of an anointed presidential candidate and the general revulsion against 
perceived corruption under President Salinas.  Economic opportunity was created by the 
necessity to undertake major fiscal adjustment in the wake of the 1984/85 Tequila crisis, that in 
particular meant that the untargeted food subsides had become unsustainable.  A  group of 
technocrats, backed by the incoming President Zedillo, then designed and introduced a means-
tested cash transfer, conditional on children attending school and mothers and children attending 
health clinics.
  By the late 1990s and 2000s 
there is effectively no questioning in the mainstream of general principles of the reform, though 
there is intense (and important) debate on complementary social action, and also over specific 
aspects of corporate governance and state-business relations. 
12
There is much more political and policy texture to these stories.  The purpose here is only to 
illustrate a general point: even outside major critical junctures there is scope for policy design 
that can have a significant influence on the dynamics of human development.  But such policy 
design has to be sufficiently aligned with the domestic social contract and local capacities to be 
feasible.  Some policy shifts can become part of a process that shifts not only specific dynamics 
  This was centrally managed within the Federal system, using central capacities 
for the beneficiary selection and financial management, combined with the good-enough local 
teaching service for verification.  External evaluation was sought to reduce the probability of the 
programme become seen as a product of one political party—the PRI indeed lost the election in 
2000 after the 70 years in power, but the incoming government, took over, re-named and 
expanded the programme.  
                                                        
11 Panagariya (2008); Damodaran(2008); Alfaro and Chari (2009).  
12 See Levy (2007); Levy was the key technical architect of PROGRESA, then from his 
(powerful) position as vice minister in the Finance ministry.  
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of the level and distribution of wealth creation and opportunities for social development, but can 
become lead to shifts in the social contract itself.   The India policy moves were consistent with a 
long-term shift toward a more open form of capitalism dependent more on dynamic rent-creation 
and sharing than fights over existing monopoly rents.  This is incomplete, and there are genuine 
risks that oligarchic forms of capitalism will undercut long-run dynamics, but it clearly changed 
the state-business relationship in this period.
13
These examples are of specific policy design changes.  There are also a range of measures that 
are more directly related to shifting the systemic  functioning of capitalism and the state.  
Introduction of competition and regulatory authorities and reform of financial regulation are 
good examples of the former.  Such regulatory attempts are contested, can be subject to re-
capture, or can lead to overbearing state action—as vividly illustrated by ongoing debates on 
financial re-regulation in the US and Europe in the wake of the 2008/09 financial crisis.  Success 
or failure is likely to depend both on the underlying political equilibrium and design specifics.  In 
similar spirit, action to increase information on state functioning is a good example, especially 
where these have been embodied in right to information laws, that have spread substantially 
around the world in rich and developing countries alike (including Mexico and India)  
    In Mexico the substitution of the targeted 
conditional cash transfer for both broad-based tortilla subsidies and (to some extent) clientelistic 
local public works programmes, led to changes in the form of the contract between the state and 
social groups outside the formal sector.  This is part of a complex ongoing process, closely 
linked to the continued imperfections of democratic functioning.  But it was a step nevertheless.  
There has been major progress in many  aspects of human development over  the past few 
decades.  But the world remains extraordinarily unequal.  Future dynamics will not depend on 
specific policy tricks, but on the overall functioning of the two most important drivers of change, 
capitalism and the state.  How this works is a question of institutional functioning that needs to 
be understood in terms of the underlying social contract within societies.  This social contract 
evolves, especially in response to the agency of domestic groups.  But policy design that is 
abstracted from an understanding of such institutional processes is likely to be irrelevant. 
                                                        
13 See Rajan (2008) for a brief statement of the threat of oligarchic capitalism; also Walton 
(2009) for an overview.   
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Appendix:  Categorization of countries by pattern of human development growth 
Appendix Table 1 presents a simple categorization of countries in relation to whether their pace 
of change was above or below the median for the human development (health and education) and 
growth in income per capita.  Countries above the median for both categories were characterized 
as being in a “virtuous” process; those below the median on human development and growth as 
being in a “vicious” process; the remainder were lopsided with respect to either human 
development (above median human development, below median growth) or growth (vice versa). 

















Central African Republic 
Congo 






  59 
Indonesia 




































Former Soviet Union  
  60 
Guatemala 
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Source: Human Development Report office. 
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